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Our form of government and our legal system are distinguished 
from others by their commitment to the “rule of law.”  In the criminal 
law, in particular, this commitment is aggressively enforced through a 
series of doctrines that, taken together, demand a prior legislative en-
actment expressed with precision and clarity, traditionally bannered 
as the “legality principle.”  However, it is argued here that the tradi-
tional legality principle analysis actually conflates two distinct issues:  
one relating to the ex ante need for fair notice, the other to the ex 
post concern for fair adjudication.  There are in fact two different 
kinds of legality—rules legality and adjudication legality—that suggest 
different, and sometimes conflicting, conclusions about the proper 
formulation and application of the legality doctrines.  The criminal 
law would be better served, it is argued, by giving these two principles 
independent recognition and application. 
I.  THE LEGALITY DOCTRINES AND THEIR RATIONALES 
In its original Latin dress, the legality principle was expressed as 
“nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege,” meaning roughly “no 
crime without law, nor punishment without law.”  In its modern form 
it means that criminal liability and punishment can be based only 
upon a prior legislative enactment of a prohibition that is expressed 
with adequate precision and clarity.  The principle is not a legal rule, 
but rather a legal concept embodied in a series of legal doctrines.  It is 
“the first principle of American criminal law jurisprudence.  [It] 
overrides all other criminal law doctrines[,] . . . even though its 
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exercise may result in dangerous and morally culpable persons 
escaping punishment.”1
The doctrines that make up the “legality principle” include the 
modern abolition of common law penal doctrines, the modern prohi-
bition of the judicial creation of penal rules, special rules for the con-
struction of penal statutes, the constitutional prohibition of ex post 
facto penal laws, the due process bar of retroactive application of 
criminal rules, and the due process invalidation of vague criminal 
statutes. 
A.  Abolition of Common Law Doctrines 
Even with the advent of criminal codes, it is not uncommon for 
courts to refer back to common law doctrines.2  Common law crimes 
allow courts to punish conduct that injures the public, even in the 
1 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 5.01[A], at 39 (3d ed. 
2001) (footnote omitted). 
2 See, e.g., Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975) (looking to the common law, and 
specifically to 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *216, for an understanding of 
what constitutes a “crime against nature”); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 
1326 (Mass. 1984) (looking to the common law to determine that a viable fetus was 
considered a “person” and could therefore be a homicide victim).  The common law is 
also used to give meaning to statutory provisions.  See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 
U.S. 451, 454-58 (1939) (relying, inter alia, on the lack of a definition for the word 
“gang” in the common law in agreeing with the defendants’ vagueness claim); Nash v. 
United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1913) (looking to the common law to determine 
what constitutes a “conspiracy and combination in restraint of trade” in violation of the 
Sherman Act); United States v. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357, 362 (10th Cir. 1988) (refer-
ring to the common law to determine the meaning of the phrase “duty of loyalty” 
within the Colorado commercial bribery statute); State v. Potts, 254 P.2d 1023, 1024 
(Ariz. 1953) (looking to the common law to define the statutory terms “sodomy” and 
“crime against nature”); People v. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d 45, 49 (Ill. 1987) (looking to 
the common law offense of rape to determine the meaning of the word “force” within 
the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute); People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203, 207 
(Ill. 1980) (looking to the common law to determine whether a viable fetus constitutes 
an “individual” within the state murder prohibition); State v. Moore, 199 So. 661, 662 
(La. 1940) (holding that the common law year-and-a-day rule applies where the statute 
punishes “murder”); State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Minn. 1985) (using common 
law rules of construction to determine whether an unborn fetus constitutes a “human 
being” under the Minnesota vehicular homicide statute); State v. De Wolfe, 93 N.W. 
746, 746-47 (Neb. 1903) (applying the common law definition of nuisance in deciding 
whether the statute’s reference to “any nuisance” included exposing others to a conta-
gious disease); Sneed v. State, 65 P.2d 1245, 1247-48 (Okla. Crim. App. 1937) (looking 
to the common law definitions of “larceny” and “stealing” in interpreting an unclear 
robbery statute). 
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absence of an explicit statutory prohibition.3  As Joseph Story phrased 
it: 
[T]he common law is not in its nature and character an absolutely fixed, 
inflexible system, like the statute law . . . . It is rather a system of elemen-
tary principles and of general juridical truths, which are continually ex-
panding with the progress of society, and adapting themselves to the 
gradual changes of trade and commerce, and the mechanic arts, and the 
exigencies and usages of the country.
4
This elasticity of the common law is regarded as its great 
advantage,5 but is also its fatal flaw in undermining the virtues of legal-
ity.  Under current law, most states abolish common law crimes,6 or 
provide that no act or omission is a crime unless made so by the code 
3 For example, in Commonwealth v. Mochan, 110 A.2d 788, 790 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1955), the common law was invoked to punish the maker of obscene telephone calls. 
The rule, whether embodied in a “reception statute” or not, is that the Eng-
lish common law of a general nature, together with the English statutory law 
in aid of the common law, existing at the time of the founding of the Ameri-
can colonies, if applicable to local conditions, is the law of the state unless re-
pealed expressly or impliedly by statute. 
1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2.1, at 91-92 
(1986) (footnote omitted). 
4 JOSEPH STORY ET AL., CODIFICATION OF THE COMMON LAW:  REPORT OF JOSEPH 
STORY, THERON METCALF, SIMON GREENLEAF, CHARLES E. FORBES, AND LUTHER S. 
CUSHING MADE TO THE LEGISLATURE OF MASSACHUSETTS IN 1836, at 6 (New York, Mar-
tin B. Brown 1887). 
5 As Baron Alderson noted over 150 years ago: 
It seems to me to be a very unwise thing to abolish the common law principles 
of decision, which can accommodate themselves to the varying circumstances 
of the times, and thus, as it were, to stereotype them by Act of Parliament in 
verbal definitions, many of them inaccurate.  This will leave the courts only to 
construe precise words, instead of adapting old principles to new cases as they 
arise. 
53 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d Ser.) (1854) 9 (statement of Baron Alderson). 
6 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-104 (2004) (“Common-law crimes are abol-
ished . . . .”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500.020 (LexisNexis 1999) (“Common law offenses 
are abolished and no act or omission shall constitute a criminal offense unless desig-
nated a crime or violation under this code or another statute of this state.”); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 609.015 (West 2003) (“Common law crimes are abolished . . . .”); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-5 (West 2000) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-105 (2003) (same); 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-3 (LexisNexis 2000) (“A common-law offense for which pun-
ishment is prescribed by statute shall be punished only in the mode so prescribed.”); 
see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.05(1) (1962) (“No conduct constitutes an offense 
unless it is a crime or violation under this Code or another statute of this State.”).  
Twenty-two years after the Model Penal Code was promulgated, twenty-five jurisdic-
tions had enacted, and ten jurisdictions had proposed, statutes specifically abolishing 
common law offenses.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.05 cmt. 3 (1985). 
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or applicable statute.7  A few abolish common law offenses but retain 
common law defenses.8  And some keep the common law to the 
extent that it is not inconsistent with the code.9  As for federal law, 
7 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-1-4 (LexisNexis 1994) (“No act or omission is a crime 
unless made so by this title or by other applicable statute or lawful ordinance.”); 
ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.220 (2004) (“No conduct constitutes an offense unless it is made 
an offense (1) by this title; (2) by a statute outside this title; or (3) by a regulation au-
thorized by and lawfully adopted under a statute.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-103(b) 
(1997) (“Unless otherwise expressly provided, the provisions of this code shall govern 
the prosecution for any offense defined by a statute not part of this code . . . .”); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 202(a) (2001) (“No conduct constitutes a criminal offense unless 
it is made a criminal offense by this Criminal Code or by another law.”); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 16-1-4 (2003) (“No conduct constitutes a crime unless it is described as a crime 
in this title or in another statute of this state.”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-102(1) (1993); 
(“No behavior constitutes an offense unless it is a crime or violation under this Code 
or another statute of this State.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:7 (1997) (“A crime is that 
conduct which is defined as criminal in this Code, or in other acts of the legislature, or 
in the constitution of this state.”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 3(1) (1983) (“No 
conduct constitutes a crime unless it is prohibited (A) By this code; or (B) By any stat-
ute or private act outside of this code.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 556.026 (1999) (“Offenses 
must be defined by statute.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.03(A) (LexisNexis 2003) 
(“No conduct constitutes a criminal offense against the state unless it is defined as an 
offense in the Revised Code.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 2 (West 1998) (“No act or 
omission shall be deemed criminal or punishable except as prescribed or authorized 
by this code.”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 107(b) (West 1998) (“No conduct consti-
tutes a crime unless it is a crime under this title or another statute of this Common-
wealth.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-102(a) (1997) (“Conduct does not constitute an 
offense unless it is defined as an offense by statute, municipal ordinance, or rule au-
thorized by and lawfully adopted under a statute.”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.03(a) 
(Vernon 2003) (“Conduct does not constitute an offense unless it is defined as an of-
fense by statute, municipal ordinance, order of a county commissioners court, or rule 
authorized by and lawfully adopted under a statute.”). 
8 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.45(6) (West 2005) (“The defense of privilege can 
be claimed . . . [w]hen . . . the actor’s conduct is privileged by the statutory or common 
law of this state.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-102(a), (b) (2005) (“Common-law crimes are 
abolished.  Common-law defenses are retained unless otherwise provided by this act.”). 
9 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.01 (West 2005) (“The common law of England in 
relation to crimes, except so far as the same relates to the modes and degrees of pun-
ishment, shall be of full force in this state where there is no existing provision by stat-
ute on the subject.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-303 (2004) (“All offenses recognized by 
the common law as crimes and not herein enumerated are punishable . . . .”); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 30-1-3 (LexisNexis 1994) (“In criminal cases where no provision of this 
code is applicable, the common law . . . shall govern.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-1-1 (2002) 
(“Every act and omission which is an offense at common law, and for which no pun-
ishment is prescribed by the general laws, may be prosecuted and punished as an of-
fense at common law.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-110 (2003) (“A felony or misdemeanor 
provided by statute or in common law which is not assigned a classification pursuant to 
[another section of the penal code] must be punished as provided before enactment 
of the classification system.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 1-200 (2005) (“The common law of 
England, insofar as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and Con-
stitution of this Commonwealth, shall continue in full force within the same, and be 
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“[i]t has long been settled that there are no federal common law 
crimes; if Congress has not by statute made certain conduct criminal, 
it is not a federal crime.”10
A variety of reasons are given to support the abolition of common 
law penal rules.  First, such rules commonly fail to give fair notice, a 
quality of special importance in criminal law, where a defendant’s life 
and liberty are often at stake.11
Second, and relatedly, the lack of public knowledge of common 
law rules often means not only the unfairness of lack of notice, but 
also a reduction in the likelihood of compliance.  Common law 
crimes, which are generally unknown to the public, cannot “deter 
future offenders through fear of punishment.”12
Third, a “bedrock principle[] of criminal law is that legislatures, 
not courts, should be the primary definers of crimes.”13  “Criminal law 
the rule of decision, except as altered by the General Assembly.”); WASH. REV. CODE. 
ANN. § 9A.04.060 (West 2000) (“[T]he common law . . . shall supplement all penal 
statutes of this state . . . .”). 
10 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 2.1(c), at 92; see, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 
471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (“The definition of the elements of a criminal offense is en-
trusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely 
creatures of statute.”); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) 
(“[A]ll exercise of criminal jurisdiction in common law cases . . . is not within [courts’] 
implied powers.”).  But Congress has allowed common law crimes in the District of Co-
lumbia, as well as in federal enclaves located within states.  See 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2000) 
(directing that state law, which, as noted supra notes 8-9, sometimes incorporates the 
common law, governs criminal acts committed on certain federal lands); D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 45-401 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005) (“The common law . . . shall remain in force 
except insofar as [it is inconsistent with this code].”).  See generally Dan M. Kahan, Len-
ity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345 (arguing that Congress has 
delegated more criminal law-making authority to the judiciary than is widely assumed). 
 On the other hand, the effect of abolishing common law penal doctrines has not 
always been as significant as one might expect.  Many statutes “use common law terms 
in their statutes without defining them, in which case resort must be had to the 
common law for definition.”  LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 2.1(d), at 93.  See supra 
note 2 for examples of courts referring back to common law doctrines. 
11 See, e.g., McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (reversing a conviction 
for transporting a stolen airplane across state lines because the defendant did not have 
adequate notice that the statutory term “motor vehicle” included airplanes). 
12 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 2.1(f), at 103. 
13 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
576 (2001) (“The usual reason given is that judicial crime creation carries too big a 
risk of nonmajoritarian crimes, which in turn creates too much of a risk that ordinary 
people won’t know what behavior can get them into trouble.”).  Common law penal 
rules also allow members of the executive branch to make law: 
[T]he resort to common-law methodology broadcasts to the law-enforcement 
community a potent message:  the limits of official coercion are not fixed; the 
suggestion box is always open.  The result is that lawmaking devolves to law 
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choices are controvertible, fundamentally political, and thus best left 
to the political departments.”14  Fourth, the lack of a precise statutory 
definition leaves rules subject to interpretation.  This is likely to 
reduce the uniformity in application, as different judges use, or 
decline to use, common law doctrines.15  Finally, the judicial 
discretion introduced by reliance upon common law doctrines creates 
the potential for abuse.16
B.  Prohibition of Judicial Creation 
As offenses created by judges in the past through the common law 
process are abolished, it logically follows that the power of present 
courts to create new offenses ought to be similarly restricted.  
Bolstering this reasoning is the claim that there is now less need for 
enforcement, and police and prosecutors are invited to play too large a role in 
deciding what to punish. 
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. 
L. REV. 189, 223 (1985).   
14 Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 1269, 1294 (1998). 
15 Cf. United States v. Wenner, 351 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Guide-
lines . . . seek to promote uniformity in sentencing and to avoid reliance on outdated 
common law definitions.”). Though “the itch for uniformity in jurisprudence is 
strong,”  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 32 (1961), uniformity is particularly diffi-
cult for common law crimes given their indefinite nature.  See Charles McClain, Crimi-
nal Law Reform: Historical Development in the United States, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME 
AND JUSTICE 501, 510-12 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (stating that the Model Penal 
Code was promulgated to bring uniformity to the application of criminal law and to 
“put the house of penal jurisprudence into some kind of rational order”). 
16 For example, in R v. Manley, [1933] 1 K.B. 529, 529 (Ct. Crim. App. 1932), a de-
fendant falsely told police that she had been robbed, which resulted in the police wast-
ing time and questioning innocent persons.  The court held that despite the lack of a 
statute or precedent, the defendant was guilty of the common law misdemeanor of-
fense of “public mischief.”  Id. at 535.  As Jeffries observes: 
[T]he most telling objection to Manley is . . . [that t]he decision definitively 
includes false reports of crimes within the reach of penal sanctions, but it ex-
cludes nothing.  The law remains entirely open-ended.  No doubt some appli-
cations are predictable, but others are open to speculation.  And the incentive 
to speculate rests, first and most important, with the agencies of law enforce-
ment.  Viewed from their perspective, Manley is a continuing invitation to vin-
dicate their own notions of appropriate social control by criminal arrest and 
prosecution.  In sum, Manley is objectionable for exactly the same reasons that 
vague ‘street-cleaning’ statutes are objectionable—because it invites abusive 
and capricious enforcement, obscures discriminatory practices, and fosters 
individualization and irregularity in crime definition.  These rule-of-law con-
cerns make a persuasive case for rejecting Manley and the common-law 
methodology it represents. 
Jeffries, supra note 13, at 226. 
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such authority.  While “courts throughout the nineteenth century 
found frequent occasion to invoke previously defined non-statutory 
crimes,” there was a “progressively infrequent need to define new 
ones.”17  “Gaps in coverage were met by new legislation,” and 
therefore “the sources of law became more elaborate, detailed, and 
particularized.”18  As such, “the need to rely on very broad rubrics of 
common-law authority . . . declined.”19  Today, most state criminal 
codes expressly prohibit judicial creation of offenses,20 and, even 
when they do not, the courts themselves recognize that the period of 
such broad judicial authority has ended.21  “[I]t is well and wisely 
settled that there can be no judge-made offenses against the United 
17 Jeffries, supra note 13, at 194.  For an excellent discussion of the evolution of 
legislative criminal law development, see generally id. at 190-201. 
18 Id. at 194. 
19 Id. 
20 See statutes cited supra notes 6-7 (generally providing that an act or omission is 
not a crime unless made so by the legislature). 
21 As Jeffries observes: 
Judicial crime creation is a thing of the past.  It is both unacceptable and un-
necessary.  That is not to say that the concerns of legality are never tested, but 
only that they arise under the subsidiary doctrines of vagueness and strict con-
struction—doctrines that, although of very different origin, are used today to 
implement the legality ideal. 
 . . . . 
 . . . As the branch most directly accountable to the people, only the legisla-
ture could validate the surrender of individual freedom necessary to forma-
tion of the social contract.  The legislature, therefore, was the only legitimate 
institution for enforcing societal judgments through the penal law.  Judicial 
innovation was politically illegitimate. 
Jeffries, supra note 13, at 195, 202 (footnote omitted); see also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra 
note 3, § 2.1, at 88-103 (explaining why the modern view is against judicial crime crea-
tion).  According to Jeffries, there have been only two examples of judicial crime crea-
tion during the past century.  Id. at 194 n.13; see Commonwealth v. Donoghue, 63 
S.W.2d 3, 9 (Ky. 1933) (sustaining an indictment for participation in a “nefarious plan 
for the habitual exaction of gross usury” despite an absence of any prior definition of 
the crime); Commonwealth v. Mochan, 110 A.2d 788, 791 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955) (af-
firming a misdemeanor conviction for making obscene telephone calls despite the ab-
sence of either a statute or precedent condemning such misconduct).  Indeed, over a 
hundred years ago, Emlin McClain wrote that “very few instances will be found among 
the modern cases in which the courts have taken it upon themselves to declare acts 
criminal which do not come within the description of well-recognized common-law of-
fenses.”  1 EMLIN MCCLAIN, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 16, at 20 (AMS Press 
1974) (1897).  See generally 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 35(a)(3), 
at 153 (1984) (noting that while the judiciary is not entirely barred from creating or 
modifying offenses, there exists a general presumption against doing so). 
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States and that every federal prosecution must be sustained by 
statutory authority.”22
But even where there may be a need for judicial creation of new 
offenses, the same set of arguments works against the recognition of 
such power.  A judicially created rule is necessarily one that did not 
previously exist, at least not in the case in which it is created.  Such a 
rule therefore violates the doctrinal requirement that “all criminal 
laws . . . give notice to the populace as to what activity is made criminal 
so as to provide fair notice to persons before making their activity 
criminal.”23  Indeed, “[t]he rationale for this is obvious:  crimes must 
be defined in advance so that individuals have fair warning of what is 
forbidden.”24  The lack of prior notice also makes it less likely that the 
law can gain compliance, through deterrence or other such 
mechanism.25  “[B]ecause we assume that man is free to steer between 
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of 
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.”26
22 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 456-57 (1949) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring). 
23 Bynum v. State, 767 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc).  The 
court explained: 
The concept that prior notice of criminal offenses is essential to fundamental 
fairness in a democracy is, somewhat surprisingly, not of ancient vintage.  The 
principle of “legality,” or nulla poena sine lege, condemns judicial crime crea-
tion.” The converse, or legislative crime creation, which is an essential ele-
ment of notice, evolved from the literary and philosophical enlightenment 
movement in Europe between [about] 1660 and [about] 1770.  Or, as it was 
known in England, the Age of Reason.  In adopting many of the ideologies 
prevalent at this time, the emerging American nation elected to replace 
common law crimes with systematic legislative enactment. 
Id. at 773 n.5.  “[T]he principle of legality asserts that certain constraints on the 
process of crime definition are essential to the ethical integrity of the criminal law as a 
system of rules, and it seeks to maintain those constraints without regard to the 
content of the rules chosen.”  PETER W. LOW ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW:  CASES AND 
MATERIALS 34 (2d ed. 1986). 
24 Bynum, 767 S.W.2d at 773.  A lack of notice poses a “trap for the innocent,” 
United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952), and “violates the first essential of 
due process,” Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
25 See Campbell v. Bennett, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (“[T]he 
due-process concept of fair notice . . . is central to the legitimacy of our legal system:  
‘Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an oppor-
tunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expec-
tations should not be lightly disrupted.’” (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 
U.S. 244, 265 (1994))).  See generally John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of 
Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984) (arguing that 
uncertainty both overdeters and underdeters). 
26 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 
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A third offered rationale arises from the preference for legislative 
rather than judicial creation of criminal law rules.  In the classic view, 
“legislatures . . . faithfully represent popular norms, and hence 
accurately define the universe of serious norm-breakers, while prudish 
old judges seek to impose their unrepresentative values on an 
unfortunate population.”27  “Lawmaking was the legislative province.  
As the branch most directly accountable to the people, only the 
legislature could validate the surrender of individual freedom 
necessary to [the] formation of the social contract.”28   
A fourth rationale opposing judicial creation of criminal law rules 
arises from a concern for uniformity in application.  Different judges 
may well come to different conclusions about the rules that should be 
created and how they should be formulated.29   
Finally, and relatedly, judicial discretion creates the potential for 
the abuse of discretion.  The danger is not just arbitrary application by 
judges but, because judicially created rules are usually less clear and 
less fixed, the danger is arbitrary application by other decision makers 
in the criminal justice process, with “the potential for arbitrary and 
27 Stuntz, supra note 13, at 576; see id. (“It is no coincidence that in criminal law 
casebooks, the norm of legislative supremacy is taught with reference to two English 
cases involving consensual sex where judges stretched to impose criminal liability.”); see 
also Knuller v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1973] A.C. 435, 457 (H.L. 1972) (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (holding that although homosexual acts had been recently legalized, 
the defendant was nonetheless guilty of conspiracy to corrupt public morals when he 
published advertisements soliciting homosexual companionship); Shaw v. Dir. of Pub. 
Prosecutions, [1962] A.C. 220, 236 (H.L. 1961) (appeal taken from Eng.) (affirming a 
conviction for conspiracy to corrupt public morals of a man who published prostitutes’ 
advertisements). 
28 Jeffries, supra note 13, at 202; see id. (“The legislature, therefore, was the only le-
gitimate institution for enforcing societal judgments through the penal law.  Judicial 
innovation was politically illegitimate.”).  However, William Stuntz argues that this im-
age of the legislature is backwards, because legislators “are likely to criminalize con-
duct ordinary people might innocently engage in—not in order to punish that con-
duct, but in order to take symbolic stands or to make punishment of other conduct 
easier.”  Stuntz, supra note 13, at 576. “Courts’ lawmaking tendencies are more bal-
anced, less tilted in favor of broader liability.”  Id.  Stuntz argues that “[t]he places in 
criminal law where the scope of liability has expanded are almost all the product of 
legislation,” and that “[t]he few places where liability has contracted find their source 
in judicial opinions.”  Id. at 576-77. 
29 Cf. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine:  Someone 
to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 179 (1994) (“[T]he incremental progres-
sion of . . . the intangible rights doctrine . . . is an excellent example of judicial crime 
creation. . . . [P]rosecutors . . . bring previously undefined conduct to trial in the hope 
that the court will criminalize it.” (footnote omitted)).  Criminal laws “should be 
founded upon principles that are permanent, uniform, and universal.” 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *3. 
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discriminatory enforcement of the penal law and the resort to legal 
formalism as a constraint against unbridled discretion.”30  “The risk 
involved is that judicial particularization of the broad rubrics of 
common-law authority will be too ‘subjective,’ too closely grounded in 
the facts of the case at hand, [and] insufficiently abstracted from the 
personal characteristics of the individual defendant.”31
C.  Special Rules for the Construction of Penal Statutes 
Criminal statutes are “strictly construed so that only that conduct 
which is clearly and manifestly within the statutory terms is subject to 
punitive sanctions.”32  The rule of strict construction directs that 
judicial resolution of residual uncertainties “be resolved in favor of 
lenity.”33  However, “there is no occasion to construe a penal statute 
strictly or otherwise if the statute is devoid of ambiguity.”34  The Su-
preme Court has stated: 
The canon in favor of strict construction [of criminal statutes] is not an 
inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory 
purpose. . . . Nor does it demand that a statute be given the “narrowest 
meaning”; it is satisfied if the words are given their fair meaning in ac-
cord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers.
35
30 Jeffries, supra note 13, at 201. 
31 Id. at 214; see also Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108 (“[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory en-
forcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply 
them.”). 
32 State v. Carter, 570 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Wash. 1977). 
33 Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).  While “[a]n ambiguous crimi-
nal statute will often be narrowly construed, but, as so construed, upheld by the courts, 
a vague criminal statute”—one “‘that men of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application’”—“is unconstitutional.”  LAFAVE & 
SCOTT, supra note 3, § 2.2(d), at 112 (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 
385, 391 (1926)).  “No doubt there is no exact borderline which can be drawn between 
a statute which is merely ambiguous and one which is unconstitutionally vague.”  Id.  
Herbert Packer has described the rule of strict construction “as something of a junior 
version of the vagueness doctrine.”  HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
SANCTION 95 (1968). 
34 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 2.2(d), at 109; see, e.g., United States v. Culbert, 
435 U.S. 371, 373-74 (1978) (looking to the statutory language and legislative history of 
the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976), to determine that Congress intended to make 
criminal all conduct within the reach of the statute’s language, and did not intend to 
limit the statute’s scope by reference to an undefined category of conduct termed 
“racketeering”); State v. Dean, 357 N.W.2d 307, 309-10 (Iowa 1984) (holding that the 
act of breaking into a parking meter to steal money was plainly covered by a burglary 
statute). 
35 United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1948); see also Culbert, 435 U.S. at 379 
(“[H]ere Congress has conveyed its purpose clearly, and we decline to manufacture 
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There are complaints that, while some courts follow the rule 
faithfully, for other courts, “strict construction is a makeweight, 
opportunistically invoked and just as conveniently discarded.”36  That 
is, there is concern that some courts use it selectively:  only when it 
produces a result that they want.  This would seem to directly 
undermine one of its goals:  giving deference to legislative intent.  
Perhaps in part for this reason, but more likely because it has more 
aggressively advanced legality interests in its standard drafting, the 
Model Penal Code shifts to the somewhat less rigid fair import rule, 
requiring that: 
[t]he provisions of the Code . . . be construed according to the fair im-
port of their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing con-
structions it . . . be interpreted to further the general purposes stated in 
this Section and the special purposes of the particular provision in-
volved.
37
A majority of states have followed the Model Code’s lead,38 
although some have reverted back to the rule of strict construction 
ambiguity where none exists.”); United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 145 (1975) (fol-
lowing the principle stated in Brown); United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 510 
(1955) (stating that the canons of clear statement and strict construction do “not mean 
that every criminal statute must be given the narrowest possible meaning in complete 
disregard of the purpose of the legislature”), overruled on other grounds by Hubbard v. 
United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995); State v. Newman, 313 N.W.2d 484, 486 (Iowa 1981) 
(“[T]he rule of strict construction is not to be used to inject doubt when legislative in-
tent is evident through a reasonable construction of the statute.”); State v. Rinkes, 306 
P.2d 205, 207 (Wash. 1957) (“Strict construction of a penal statute means merely that 
the punitive sanctions must be confined to such matters as are clearly . . . within the 
statutory terms and purposes.  It does not mean that a forced, narrow, and over-strict 
construction should be applied to defeat the obvious intent of the legislature.”). 
36 Jeffries, supra note 13, at 238; see, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 
120 (2d Cir. 1982) (“We are not unaware of the time-honored tenet of statutory con-
struction that ambiguous laws which impose penal sanctions are to be strictly con-
strued against the Government.  [But] it is indisputable that there are situations in 
which the legislature has intended to define broadly the scope of criminal liability.” 
(citations omitted)). 
37 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(3) (1962).  The provision continues:  “The discre-
tionary powers conferred by the Code shall be exercised in accordance with the crite-
ria stated in the Code and, insofar as such criteria are not decisive, to further the gen-
eral purposes stated in this Section.”  Id. 
38 Specifically, thirteen states have explicitly abolished the rule of strict construc-
tion (Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New 
York, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah), sixteen states require 
narrow construction by maintaining that statutes be interpreted according to their 
“common,” “ordinary,” or “popular” meaning (Alabama, Alaska, California, Connecti-
cut, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Ne-
braska, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Wyoming), and five states direct that 
statutes be construed in line with the “general purpose” of the criminal code, which 
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either by legislation39 or by judicial decision.40  The net effect is that, 
while the rule of strict construction lives, it is commonly supplanted by 
the less rigid rule of fair import.41
The rationales offered in support of other legality doctrines are 
also offered in support of the special rules for the construction of 
penal statutes.42  These include giving fair notice and gaining compli-
ance “to assure that citizens have adequate notice of the terms of the 
law, as required by due process,”43 because “[m]en of common 
intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning of the 
enactment.”44  “Just as the concern for notice would require invalid-
ation of laws that give no fair warning, it would also imply that 
remaining ambiguities be resolved against the state.”45  Another 
does not include strict construction (Colorado, Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and 
Washington).  Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 885, 902-03 & nn.111-18 (2004).  Two states have codified the rule of lenity (Flor-
ida and Ohio), and the “codes of the remaining fifteen jurisdictions, including the Dis-
trict of Columbia, include no rule of construction relevant to lenity.”  Id. at 902 n.110, 
903. 
39 Id. at 902 n.110 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.021 (West 2000) and OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2901.04(A) (Anderson 2002)). 
40 Id. at 904 (“Courts in several states—Arizona, Idaho, New Hampshire, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, and Texas—continue to employ the rule of lenity despite stat-
utes directing them not to.”). 
41 See John F. Decker, Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in 
American Criminal Laws, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 241, 265 (2002) (“At the core of this 
movement to eliminate the rule [of strict construction] lies the notion that its imple-
mentation oftentimes runs contrary to legislative intent.”); see also PAUL H. ROBINSON, 
CRIMINAL LAW § 2.3, at 93 (1997) (“[T]he rule can frustrate a legislature’s obvious in-
tent on what can be an important issue and risks bringing the criminal justice system 
into disrepute, subjecting it to the criticism that it is a game governed by technicalities, 
having little relation to fairness or justice.”). 
42 But note that the rationales supporting the special rules for the construction of 
penal statutes are more limited than those supporting the legality prohibitions on 
common law offenses, judicial creation of offenses, and vagueness.  Specifically, two of 
the rationales offered in support of other legality doctrines—increasing uniformity in 
application and reducing the potential for abuse of discretion—do not seem relevant 
to the purposes of the special rules for the construction of penal statutes. 
43 State v. Shipp, 610 P.2d 1322, 1326 (Wash. 1980). 
44 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948); see also infra text accompanying 
note 107 (quoting Justice Holmes’ statement regarding the importance of giving “fair 
warning” to both criminals and society at large). 
45 Jeffries, supra note 13, at 210. 
Otherwise, the interpretation of penal statutes would threaten that same un-
fair surprise against which the vagueness doctrine more generally guards.  In 
effect, strict construction strips away from the criminal law those potential ap-
plications for which fair warning was not clearly given.  In this respect, the 
rule of strict construction is thought to implement the principle of legality 
and to reinforce the prohibition against indefinite laws. 
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rationale for the special construction of penal statutes is the 
reservation of the criminalization authority by the legislature.  The 
special construction rule “is founded . . . on the plain principle that 
the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial 
department.  It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a 
crime, and ordain its punishment.”46  It is “because of the seriousness 
of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually 
represents the moral condemnation of the community, [that] 
legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.”47
D.  Ex Post Facto Prohibition 
The United States Constitution forbids both the federal 
government and the states from enacting any ex post facto law.48  An 
early Supreme Court decision defined ex post facto laws as: 
1st.  Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, 
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.  
2d.  Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, 
when committed.  3d.  Every law that changes the punishment, and in-
flicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when 
committed.  4th.  Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and re-
ceives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of 
the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender.
49
Id.  There is some complaint, however, that the rule does not effectively serve the ra-
tionale: 
[J]udicial administration of the rule belies any real concern for fair warning.  
Pronouncements in ancient precedent are taken to have resolved statutory 
ambiguity, no matter how unlikely it may be that the accused has had access to 
such discussions.  Mistake is irrelevant.  Even where the defendant shows ac-
tual reliance on an interpretation of law and further shows that such reliance 
was prudent and reasonable, the law does not care.  The individual must get it 
right, and no amount of good faith or due diligence is exculpatory.  The con-
verse is also true:  strict construction may be invoked without regard to the de-
fendant’s actual expectation or belief.  Uncertainty in coverage is said to 
threaten unfair surprise, even where there is no plausible claim that the actor 
relied on any view of the law. 
Id. at 210-11. 
46 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820). 
47 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971). 
48 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall 
be passed.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attain-
der, [or] ex post facto Law . . . .”). 
49 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (Chase, J.) (emphases removed); 
see id. (“The prohibition, ‘that no state shall pass any ex post facto law,’ necessarily re-
quires some explanation; for, naked and without explanation, it is unintelligible, and 
means nothing. . . . I would ask, what fact; of what nature, or kind; and by whom 
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Other decisions have similarly defined an ex post facto law as one 
which “makes that criminal or penal which was not so at the time the 
action was performed; or which increases the punishment; or in short, 
which, in relation to the offence, or its consequences, alters the 
situation of a party to his disadvantage.”50  However, “not every law 
done?” (emphases removed)).  An ex post facto law also has been defined as a “law 
passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively 
changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed.”  BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 520 (5th ed. 1979).  In Calder, Justice Chase explained the distinction between 
ex post facto laws and retrospective laws: 
Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective; but every retrospec-
tive law is not an ex post facto law:  The former only are prohibited.  Every law 
that takes away, or impairs, rights vested, agreeably to existing laws, is retro-
spective, and is generally unjust, and may be oppressive; and it is a good gen-
eral rule, that a law should have no retrospect:  but there are cases in which 
laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community, and also of individuals, 
relate to a time antecedent to their commencement; as statutes of oblivion, or 
of pardon.  They are certainly retrospective, and literally both concerning, 
and after, the facts committed.  But I do not consider any law ex post facto, 
within the prohibition, that mollifies the rigor of the criminal law; but only 
those that create, or aggravate, the crime; or increase the punishment, or 
change the rules of evidence, for the purpose of conviction.  Every law that is 
to have an operation before the making thereof, as to commence at an ante-
cedent time; or to save time from the statute of limitations; or to excuse acts 
which were unlawful, and before committed, and the like; is retrospective.  
But such laws may be proper or necessary, as the case may be.  There is a great 
and apparent difference between making an unlawful act lawful; and the mak-
ing an innocent action criminal, and punishing it as a crime. 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 391 (emphases removed). 
50 United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 84, 86 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No. 15,285), aff’d, 10 
U.S. (6 Cranch) 171 (1810); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292-97 (1977) 
(discussing the characteristics of an ex post facto law).  As Beazell v. Ohio summarizes it, 
[A]ny statute which punishes . . . an act previously committed, which was in-
nocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a 
crime, after its commission, or which deprives one . . . of any defense available 
according to law at the time the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post 
facto. 
269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925).  Thus, for example, the prohibition bars liability for past 
use of a drug that is currently a controlled substance but that was not at the time it was 
used.  It similarly would bar application of a statute that changes an offense’s punish-
ment from life imprisonment or death to a mandatory death penalty when the offense 
is committed before the statutory change.  See, e.g., Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 432-
36 (1987) (holding that states cannot enhance punishment by altering substantive 
guidelines used to calculate applicable sentencing ranges); Flaherty v. Thomas, 94 
Mass. 428, 436-47 (1866) (holding that the defendant could not be punished for sell-
ing and possessing “intoxicating liquors” under either the old or new statute because 
the old statute was repealed by the new statute, which was not yet in force at time of 
the offense); cf. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504-13 (1995) (holding 
that a statute reducing the frequency of parole hearings complies with the Ex Post 
Facto Clause because the offender’s punishment is not increased). 
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which merely disadvantages a defendant retrospectively is an ex post 
facto law.”51  The Supreme Court has determined that “a procedural 
change is not ex post facto,”52 because “the constitutional provision 
was intended to secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary 
and oppressive legislation, and not to limit the legislative control of 
remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of 
substance.”53
The ex post facto prohibition is concerned with federal and state 
legislative acts, rather than judicial decisions,54 and applies only “to 
criminal, not to civil, cases.”55  The determinative question is whether 
51 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 644, at 123-24 (2004); see, e.g., Morales, 514 
U.S. at 508 (“[The defendant] urges us to hold that the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids any 
legislative change that has any conceivable risk of affecting a prisoner’s punish-
ment. . . . Our cases have never accepted this expansive view of the Ex Post Facto Clause, 
and we will not endorse it here.”); People v. Mesce, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 749 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1997) (“The focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative 
change produces some ambiguous sort of ‘disadvantage,’ . . . but on whether any such 
change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a 
crime is punishable (quoting Morales, 514 U.S. at 506 n.3) (alteration in original)). 
52 Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293-94 (holding that the change in the statute, which “simply 
altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be 
imposed,” was clearly procedural).  The Dobbert Court concluded that “[t]he crime for 
which the present defendant was indicted, the punishment prescribed therefor, and 
the quantity or the degree of proof necessary to establish his guilt, all remained unaf-
fected by the subsequent statute.”  Id. at 294 (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589-
90 (1884)).  However, “by simply labeling a law ‘procedural,’ a legislature does not 
thereby immunize it from scrutiny under the Ex Post Facto Clause.”  Collins v. 
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 46 (1990).  It is “logical to think that the term [‘procedural’] 
refers to changes in the procedures by which a criminal case is adjudicated, as opposed 
to changes in the substantive law of crimes.”  Id. at 45. 
53 Beazell, 269 U.S. at 171 (citation omitted). 
54 The prohibition in the Federal Constitution against ex post facto legislation was 
placed in Article I, Section 10, which governs legislative powers, and not in Article III, 
which governs the judiciary.  The Supreme Court has held that that provision, accord-
ing to the natural import of its term, is a restraint upon legislative power and concerns 
the making of laws, not their construction, by the courts.  Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 
150, 162-63 (1913) (stating that “whilst thus uniformly holding that the provision is di-
rected against legislative, but not judicial, acts, this court with like uniformity has re-
garded it as reaching every form in which the legislative power of a State is exerted,” 
including constitutions, amendments, and any other legislative action).  However, due 
process does apply to the construction of statutes by the courts, and principles similar 
to those involved in ex post facto doctrine have evolved.  For a discussion of courts’ 
due process obligations in construing statutes and the effect of Bouie v. City of Columbia, 
378 U.S. 347 (1964), see infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
55 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Chase, J.).  Modern courts have 
continued to apply the ex post facto prohibition solely to criminal enactments.  See, 
e.g., De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (plurality opinion) (upholding the 
New York Waterfront Commission’s prohibition on convicted felons holding office in 
the governmental organization); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) 
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the legislature meant to establish a punitive law or a civil regulation.  
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme Court articulated the 
seven factors to be applied to determine whether a specific sanction is 
punitive under the ex post facto prohibition.56  However, courts 
generally give great deference to the legislature’s stated intent and 
rely heavily on the statutory language and legislative history of the 
statute.57  Additionally, for a criminal or penal law to fall within this 
prohibition, it “must apply to events occurring before its enactment.”58  
The ex post facto prohibition is justified by some of the same 
rationales as the legality doctrines already examined.59
(declining to apply the prohibition in a deportation proceeding); Green v. Bd. of Elec-
tions, 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding that the disenfranchisement of a con-
victed felon is not a form of punishment and does not violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause). 
56 372 U.S. 144 (1963).  The Court considered 
[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether 
it has historically been regarded as a punishment[,] whether it comes into 
play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the tradi-
tional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior 
to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which 
it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears ex-
cessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. 
Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).  If the legislature intended to enact a regulatory 
scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, the court must then examine whether the 
statutory scheme is “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the state’s] 
intention.”  United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980); cf. United States v. One 
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984) (holding a forfeiture provision to 
be a civil sanction even though the authorizing statute was in the criminal code). 
57 For example, in E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1096 n.16 (3d Cir. 1997), the 
Third Circuit held that the New Jersey legislature clearly intended that Megan’s Law, 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to -11 (West 1994), serve a remedial purpose:  the legislature 
made specific findings that “[t]he danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders . . . re-
quire[s] a system of registration that will permit law enforcement officials to identify 
[previous offenders] and alert the public when necessary for the public safety.”  Ac-
cordingly, sex offender registration and notification laws have been deemed to not vio-
late the ex post facto prohibition.  See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 
(1997) (examining an ex post facto challenge to the post-incarceration confinement of 
sex offenders and holding that “[n]othing on the face of the statute suggests that the 
legislature sought to create anything other than a civil commitment scheme designed 
to protect the public from harm”); State ex rel. B.G., 674 A.2d 178, 184 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1996) (noting that Megan’s Law is “designed not to punish the criminals, but 
to protect society”). 
58 Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981). 
59 Note that these rationales are somewhat more limited than those supporting 
the other legality doctrines previously discussed.  Specifically, three of the rationales 
offered in support of other legality doctrines—reserving the criminalization decision 
for the legislature, increasing uniformity in application, and reducing the potential for 
abuse of discretion—do not seem relevant to the purposes of the retroactivity prohibi-
tion. 
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As relates to the goals of fair notice and gaining compliance, the 
ex post facto prohibition “prevent[s] prosecution and punishment 
without fair warning.”60  It serves “to assure that legislative Acts give 
fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their 
meaning until explicitly changed.”61  “The doctrine that ex post facto 
laws are unconstitutional plainly serves the values of fairness and 
liberty.  Retroactive criminal laws would both unfairly disappoint 
reliance on an activity not being criminal when it is done, and chill 
liberty by the fear that such surprise might be forthcoming.”62
The reason why [ex post facto] laws are so universally condemned is, 
that they overlook the great object of all criminal law, which is, to hold 
up the fear and certainty of punishment as a counteracting motive, to 
the minds of persons tempted to crime, to prevent them from commit-
ting it.  But a punishment prescribed after an act is done, cannot, of 
course, present any such motive.
63
60 United States v. Gerber, 24 F.3d 93, 96 (10th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Justice Chase, in Calder v. Bull, acknowledged that “the very nature of 
our free Republican governments” implies “that no man should be compelled to do 
what the laws do not require; nor to refrain from acts which the laws permit.”  3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) at 388 (emphases omitted).  The court in Warren v. United States Parole Commis-
sion concluded that Justice Chase 
expressed a libertarian ideal appropriate for a pluralist society in which uni-
versal consensus will rarely exist as to the immorality of lawful acts.  Because 
an individual in such a society cannot be charged with knowledge that his law-
ful acts are immoral in the absence of an existing criminal enactment, the 
element of mens rea cannot be assumed to exist.  The legislature therefore is 
prohibited from retroactively imposing criminal penalties for the perpetration 
of lawful acts perhaps considered immoral only by some.  In a society commit-
ted to liberty and not governed by orthodoxy the presumption must be that 
acts not specifically prohibited are permitted.  Such a presumption guarantees 
that the citizenry may feel secure in acting in reliance on existing law and as-
sures that fair notice will be given of any change. 
659 F.2d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (footnotes omitted).   
61 Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981). 
62 MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME:  THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IM-
PLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW 240 (1993) (footnote omitted). 
63 Warren, 659 F.2d at 188 (quoting Jacquins v. Commonwealth, 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 
279, 281 (1852)).  While the other goals of the modern criminal law, such as rehabili-
tation, retribution, and incapacitation, “can all be satisfied to some degree by ex post 
facto legislation[, t]he constitutional ban on ex post facto laws . . . suggests that the 
framers considered the possibility of special deterrence a prerequisite to the imposi-
tion of specifically criminal penalties.”  Id.  Accordingly, 
because special deterrence is so central to the criminal law, enactment of a 
criminal statute that cannot serve this function raises a strong presumption 
that the legislature’s motives are impermissible.  Since judicial inquiry into the 
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The prohibition “assures that the legislature can make recourse to 
the stigmatizing penalties of the criminal law only when its core 
purpose of deterrence could thereby possibly be served.”64
E.  Bar to Retroactive Application of Judicial Interpretations 
 Altering Penal Rules 
Just as the legality principle can be offended by legislative 
adoption of a criminal law rule ex post, so too can it be offended by ex 
post judicial action altering a penal rule retrospectively.65  Technically, 
the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause—providing that “No State 
shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law”66—“is a limitation upon the 
powers of the Legislature, and does not of its own force apply to the 
Judicial Branch of government.”67  On the other hand, the Court has 
consistently observed that “limitations on ex post facto judicial 
motives of the legislature is difficult and unseemly, the framers may have con-
sidered it the better course to ban such legislation from the start. 
Id. at 189. 
64 Id. 
65 See, for example, the New Mexico Supreme Court’s discussion on the subject: 
 The question then arises as to what effect shall be given this overruling deci-
sion.  Shall it operate retrospectively and possibly subject to heavy penalties 
and the stigma of criminal convictions those who, acting in reliance on the 
former decision, did only that which this court declared, even if erroneously, 
to be within the law?  Or, shall the defendants’ acts and conduct be judged by 
the then unreversed decision which stood as the best evidence of what the law 
was at the time the acts complained of took place and the overruling decision 
be confined in its operation to acts and conduct occurring after its effective 
date?  In other words, shall our decision overruling City of Roswell v. Jones  
[, 67 P.2d 286 (N.M. 1937),] be given prospective operation only?  The plain-
est principles of justice demand that it should and there is respectable author-
ity, based on sound reason, which affirms our right in a case of this kind, so to 
order. 
State v. Jones, 107 P.2d 324, 329 (N.M. 1940); see also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 
188, 194-95 (1977) (holding that the obscenity standard from Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15 (1973), could not be applied retroactively to conduct that occurred before 
Miller was decided, because Miller “expanded criminal liability,” and the defendants 
“had no fair warning that their products might be subjected to the new standards”); cf. 
State v. Bell, 49 S.E. 163, 164 (N.C. 1904) (“[W]here, in the construction of a contract 
or in declaring the law respecting its validity, the court thereafter reverses its decision, 
contractual rights as acquired by virtue of the law as declared in the first opinion will 
not be disturbed.”). 
66 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  For discussion of the Ex Post Facto Clause, see 
supra Part I.D. 
67 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977) (citation omitted); see also dis-
cussion supra note 54 (explaining that the prohibition against ex post facto legislation 
has traditionally been construed to apply as a restraint on legislative power, not judicial 
power). 
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decisionmaking are inherent in the notion of due process.”68  The Su-
preme Court, in Bouie v. City of Columbia, reasoned that judicial 
construction, while “valid for the future, . . . may not be applied 
retroactively, any more than a legislative enactment may be, to impose 
criminal penalties for conduct committed at a time when it was not 
fairly stated to be criminal.”69  But the potential breadth of the ruling 
was limited more recently, in Rogers v. Tennessee, where the Court 
stated that Bouie was “rooted firmly in well established notions of due 
process,” such as “notice, foreseeability, and, in particular, the right to 
fair warning as those concepts bear on the constitutionality of 
attaching criminal penalties to what previously had been innocent 
conduct.”70  Numerous other decisions have similarly viewed the bar 
68 Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 456 (2001).  The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
69 378 U.S. 347, 362 (1964) (holding that “the South Carolina Supreme Court, in 
applying its new construction of the statute to affirm the[] convictions, has deprived 
petitioners of rights guaranteed to them by the Due Process Clause,” and stressing that 
the “[a]pplication of this rule is particularly compelling where, as here, the petitioners’ 
conduct cannot be deemed improper or immoral”); see also Keeler v. Superior Court, 
470 P.2d 617, 627 (Cal. 1970) (concluding that in light of Bouie, the California murder 
statute could not be retroactively interpreted as to cover the killing of an unborn but 
viable fetus, because although the defendant’s conduct was “immoral” and “improper,” 
the “guarantee of due process extends to violent as well as peaceful men”).  But see 
Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50-53 (1975) (per curiam) (upholding the defendant’s 
conviction for forcible cunnilingus under a state “crime against nature” statute which, 
until defendant’s case, had not been held to extend to such conduct); United States ex 
rel. Almeida v. Rundle, 255 F. Supp. 936, 947 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (holding that judicial ret-
roactivity was plainly acceptable because the defendant’s conduct as a robber was “im-
proper, illegal, and immoral”); People v. Page, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 857, 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2004) (broadening the language of the statute in holding that the phrase “deadly 
weapon” includes sharpened pencils, and applying the statute to the defendant); Peo-
ple v. Sobiek, 106 Cal. Rptr. 519, 531 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that the defendant 
was on sufficient notice that theft from other partners in a business partnership could 
be prosecuted). 
70 532 U.S. at 459, 466-67 (holding that the Tennessee Supreme Court’s retroac-
tive application to petitioner of its decision abolishing the year-and-a-day rule did not 
deny petitioner due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).  Rogers 
held that “[e]xtending the [Ex Post Facto] Clause to courts through the rubric of due 
process . . . would circumvent the clear constitutional text,” and would “evince too lit-
tle regard for the important institutional and contextual differences between legislat-
ing, on the one hand, and common law decisionmaking, on the other.”  Id. at 460.  
The Court went on to note that its 
opinion in Bouie does contain some expansive language that is suggestive of 
the broad interpretation for which petitioner argues.  Most prominent is our 
statement that “[i]f a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from 
passing . . . a law, it must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the 
Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial con-
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on judicial retroactivity as “restricted to its traditional due process 
roots.”71  As such, “courts are now free to change both statutory and 
common law rules of criminal law retroactively as long as they find 
that Rogers’s minimal fair warning standard has been met.”72  
Accordingly, “[i]t is fair to conclude that:  (1) the prohibition of 
retroactive judicial decisions is not as extensive as the prohibition of 
ex post facto statutes; and (2) the law regarding the former is not as 
clearly developed as that concerning the ex post facto clause.”73  In 
practice, retroactive application of judicial interpretation is often 
subverted by a court’s claim that there is no retroactive application.  
The “appellate decisions [are] on matters of first impression . . . [and] 
nothing in the way of retroactivity is involved because the court has 
merely decided what the criminal statute has meant from the time of 
its enactment (and thus prior to the defendant’s conduct[]).”74
The primary rationale behind the due process prohibition of ret-
roactive application of judicial interpretation is one of fair notice.75  
struction.”  378 U.S., at 353-54; see also id., at 353 (“[A]n unforeseeable judi-
cial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely 
like an ex post facto law”); id., at 362 (“The Due Process Clause compels the 
same result” as would the constitutional proscription against ex post facto laws 
“where the State has sought to achieve precisely the same [impermissible] ef-
fect by judicial construction of the statute”).  This language, however, was 
dicta. 
Id. at 458-59 (alterations in original).  Finally, the Court held that 
[t]here is, in short, nothing to indicate that the Tennessee court’s abolition of 
the rule in petitioner’s case represented an exercise of the sort of unfair and 
arbitrary judicial action against which the Due Process Clause aims to protect.  
Far from a marked and unpredictable departure from prior precedent, the 
court’s decision was a routine exercise of common law decisionmaking in 
which the court brought the law into conformity with reason and common 
sense.  It did so by laying to rest an archaic and outdated rule that had never 
been relied upon as a ground of decision in any reported Tennessee case. 
Id. at 466-67. 
71 See id. at 459-60 (citing several Supreme Court cases to this effect)..5 
72 The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 306, 326 (2001). 
73 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 2.4(c), at 143. 
74 Id. § 2.4(c), at 145; see, e.g., Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1960) 
(holding that an appellate court may decide, as a matter of first impression, that the 
word “arson” in the felony murder statute can be read to incorporate not only the ar-
son statute (which criminalizes the burning of dwellings), but also the malicious burn-
ing statute (which criminalizes the burning of other buildings)). 
75 “There can be no doubt that a deprivation of the right of fair warning can result 
not only from vague statutory language but also from an unforeseeable and retroactive 
judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language.”  Bouie v. City of Colum-
bia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964).  “[J]udicial enlargement of a criminal Act by interpreta-
tion is at war with a fundamental concept of the common law that crimes must be de-
fined with appropriate definiteness.”  Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311 (1941).  
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Also supporting the prohibition is the criminal law’s desire to gain 
compliance through deterrence.  That is, it is no more possible to 
gain compliance with ex post facto judicial expansions of offenses 
than it is with ex post facto legislative creations.76
F.  Due Process Vagueness Prohibition 
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment and the 
Fourteenth Amendment require a criminal statute to be declared void 
when it is “so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”77  This void-for-
vagueness doctrine “forbids wholesale legislative delegation of 
lawmaking authority to the courts” and “requires that . . . ordinarily 
legislative crime definition be meaningfully precise—or at least that it 
not be meaninglessly indefinite.”78  Accordingly, a penal statute 
survives a void-for-vagueness challenge if it defines “the criminal 
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not 
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”79  If there are 
The “prohibition of retroactive judicial enlargement of criminal liability, like the ex post 
facto limitation on legislation, plainly serves the values of fairness and liberty.  For the 
purposes of these values, it does not matter whether the surprise comes from law-
making by a court or by a legislature.”  MOORE, supra note 62, at 240-41 (footnote 
omitted). 
76 See supra text accompanying notes 60-64 (noting that the problems with retroac-
tive criminal laws are a lack of fair notice and an inability to secure ex ante compliance 
through the threat of punishment).  Note that these retroactivity rationales mirror 
those of the ex post facto prohibition, and are somewhat more limited than those sup-
porting the other legality doctrines previously discussed. 
77 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).  “At common law, it was 
the practice of courts to refuse to enforce legislative acts deemed too uncertain to be 
applied,” and the Supreme Court thus “overturned federal convictions under vague 
statutes without reference to any particular constitutional proscription.”  LAFAVE & 
SCOTT, supra note 3, § 2.3, at 126 & n.1.  “The Court has also reversed convictions un-
der uncertain criminal laws on the basis that the accused was denied his right to be in-
formed ‘of the nature and cause of the accusation’ as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment.”  Id. § 2.3, at 126. 
However, today it is the void-for-vagueness doctrine which prevails:  the due 
process clauses of the Fifth Amendment (when a federal statute is involved) 
and the Fourteenth Amendment (when a state statute is involved) require 
that a criminal statute be declared void when it is so vague that “men of com-
mon intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its ap-
plication.” 
Id. 
78 Jeffries, supra note 13, at 189, 196 (footnote omitted). 
79 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
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uncertainties as to whom the statute applies,80 the conduct 
forbidden,81 or the punishment imposed,82 the statute will ultimately 
be held unconstitutional.  Arguably, unconstitutional indefiniteness 
“is itself an indefinite concept.”83  However, there is no requirement 
that a criminal statute include only words that are subject to 
“mathematical certainty.”84  Rather, “a statute need embody only as 
much exactness as the subject matter permits.”85  As such, “[a] law is 
80 See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 456-57 (1939) (holding that a stat-
ute criminalizing being a member of a “gang” was ambiguous as to whether actual or 
putative association is meant, what constitutes membership, and how one may join a 
“gang”).  The Court provided that “[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or 
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.  All are entitled to be in-
formed as to what the State commands or forbids.”  Id. at 453. 
81 See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 401 (1979) (striking down a Pennsyl-
vania abortion restriction as being impermissibly vague as to the meaning of “viable” 
and the standard of care required of abortion providers); Interstate Circuit Inc. v. City 
of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 689-90 (1968) (declaring invalid an ordinance providing for 
classification of films as either suitable or unsuitable for young persons because of “the 
lack of guidance to those who seek to adjust their conduct and to those who seek to 
administer the law”); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259 (1937) (“[W]here a statute 
is so vague and uncertain as to make criminal [an innocent act] . . . , a conviction un-
der such a law cannot be sustained.”). 
82 See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 495 (1948) (holding that where a 
great degree of uncertainty existed as to the penalty for violating the Immigration Act 
by concealing an alien, “[i]t is better for Congress, and more in accord with its func-
tion, to revise the statute than for us to guess at the revision it would make”). 
83 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing the “vague contours” of the Due Process Clause).  Jeffries argues that the diffi-
culty in the vagueness doctrine is that there is “no yardstick of impermissible indeter-
minacy,” in that the “inquiry is evaluative rather than mechanistic; it calls for a 
judgment concerning not merely the degree of indeterminacy, but also the acceptabil-
ity of indeterminacy in particular contexts.”  Jeffries, supra note 13, at 196. 
84 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (“Condemned to the 
use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.”); see also 
United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963) (“[S]tatutes are not 
automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining 
whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language.”); Vance v. Lincoln 
County Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 582 So. 2d 414, 419 (Miss. 1991) (“A rule or standard is 
not objectionable merely because it is stated in general terms and is not susceptible of 
precise application.” (quoting Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. State Oil & Gas 
Bd., 457 So. 2d 1298, 1323 (Miss. 1984))). 
85 Yandell v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 572, 575 (D. Miss. 1982). “Uncertain 
statutory language has been upheld when the subject matter would not allow more ex-
actness and when greater specificity in language would interfere with practical admini-
stration.”  LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 2.3(c), at 133 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., 
United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 33-34 (1953) (“The Constitution does not re-
quire that a tax statute cover all phases of a taxed or licensed business.”), overruled on 
other grounds by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); United States v. Petrillo, 
332 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1947) (holding that a law making it a crime to compel a broadcaster to 
employ “persons in excess of the number of employees needed” embodied as much 
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not vague simply because it requires conformity to an imprecise 
normative standard.”86  Additionally, the Supreme Court frequently, 
“in passing upon a statute claimed to be unconstitutional for 
vagueness, has concluded that the statute gives fair warning because 
scienter is an element of the offense.  That is, the statute is upheld 
because it requires that the prohibited act have been done 
‘intentionally,’ ‘knowingly,’ or ‘willfully.’”87
Context traditionally limits the application of the vagueness 
prohibition.  For example, economic regulations are “subject to a less 
strict vagueness test because [their] subject matter is often more 
narrow, and because businesses, which face economic demands to 
plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation 
in advance of action” and “may have the ability to clarify the meaning 
of the regulation by [their] own inquiry.”88  Accordingly, “if a penal 
statute is addressed to those in a particular trade or business, it is 
sufficient if the terms used have a meaning well enough defined to 
enable one engaged in that trade or business to apply it correctly.”89  
exactness as the subject matter permitted).  Significantly, “[w]hen the language of a 
statute provides an adequate warning as to the conduct it condemns and prescribes 
boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to interpret and administer it uni-
formly, constitutional requirements are fully met.”  In re Burrus, 169 S.E.2d 879, 888 
(N.C. 1969). 
86 Eanes v. State, 569 A.2d 604, 615 (Md. 1990); see, e.g., Nash v. United States, 229 
U.S. 373, 378 (1913) (holding that a requirement that a person not act “negligently” 
was not vague).  As Justice Holmes observed, “the law is full of instances where a man’s 
fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, 
some matter of degree.”  Id. at 377. 
87 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 2.3(b), at 130 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Vill. 
of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982) (“[T]he 
Court has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, espe-
cially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is pro-
scribed.”); see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 394 (1979) (discussing how a stat-
ute’s vague requirements for determining a fetus’s viability actually exacerbate the 
potential for physician criminal liability); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 
U.S. 337, 343 (1952) (upholding an indictment under an Interstate Commerce Com-
mission regulation requiring drivers of vehicles transporting explosives or inflamma-
bles to avoid congested thoroughfares and tunnels “so far as practicable, and where 
feasible,” because the statute punished only knowing violations of the regulation); 
United States v. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1988) (“[A] scienter require-
ment may mitigate a criminal law’s vagueness by ensuring that it punishes only those 
who are aware their conduct is unlawful.”). 
88 Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498 (footnote omitted). 
89 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 2.3(b), at 129; see, e.g., Hygrade Provision Co. v. 
Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502 (1925) (“The evidence, while conflicting, warrants the 
conclusion that the term ‘kosher’ has a meaning well enough defined to enable one 
engaged in the trade to correctly apply it, at least as a general thing.”). 
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Similarly, the Court has concluded that “[f]or the reasons which 
differentiate military society from civilian society, we think Congress is 
permitted to legislate both with greater breadth and with greater 
flexibility when prescribing the rules by which the former shall be 
governed than it is when prescribing rules for the latter.”90  In 
contrast, a “statute with uncertain language is more likely to be 
declared void for vagueness if it is addressed to the general public or 
to a substantial group of persons who have not voluntarily chosen to 
subject themselves to a particular regulatory scheme.”91
As one might expect, there is some overlap among the legality 
doctrines.  Thus, the vagueness prohibition is used to invalidate 
common law offenses.  For example, in State v. Palendrano, the 
prosecution, pursuing a charge for the common law offense of being a 
“common scold,” relied upon a statute that sought to criminalize all 
conduct that was indictable at common law, but that did not specify 
the actions or offenses to be criminalized.92  The court explained that 
“[o]ne can scarcely conceive of anything more vague or indefinite.  
To know the criminal risks he might run, the average citizen would be 
obliged to carry a pocket edition of Blackstone with him.”93  Similarly, 
because the “principles underlying the void for vagueness doctrine . . . 
stem from concepts of procedural due process,”94 it should not be a 
surprise to find a substantial overlap with the rationales offered in 
support of the invalidation of common law offenses. 
1.  Fair Notice and Gaining Compliance 
The Supreme Court has stated that “[n]o one may be required at 
peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal 
statutes.  All are entitled to be informed as to what the State 
90 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974) (holding that military prohibitions 
against “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman” were not unconstitutionally 
vague and stating that the vagueness standard applicable to criminal statutes regulating 
economic affairs also applies to the Uniform Code of Criminal Justice). 
91 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 2.3(b), at 129. 
92 293 A.2d 747, 748-49 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972) (noting that a state statute 
which criminalized “nuisances . . . and all other offenses of an indictable nature at 
common law and not otherwise expressly provided for by statute” was an attempt by 
the legislature to criminalize all of the common law offenses it had failed to previously 
criminalize).  The court explained that a “common scold” is “a troublesome and angry 
woman, who, by brawling and wrangling among her neighbors, breaks the public 
peace, increases discord, and becomes a nuisance to the neighborhood.”  Id. at 748 
(citation omitted). 
93 Id. at 752. 
94 State v. Popanz, 332 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Wis. 1983). 
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commands or forbids.”95  “[B]ecause we assume that man is free to 
steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the 
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know 
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.  Vague laws may 
trap the innocent by not providing a fair warning.”96
95 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); see also Lambert v. California, 
355 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1957) (holding that due process bars criminal liability for failing 
to act when the prototypical law-abiding individual would have had no reason to act 
otherwise). 
The objection of vagueness is two-fold:  inadequate guidance to the individual 
whose conduct is regulated, and inadequate guidance to the triers of fact.  
The former objection could not be cured retrospectively by a ruling either of 
the trial court or the appellate court, though it might be cured for the future 
by an authoritative judicial gloss. 
Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REV. 533, 541 (1951) 
(footnote omitted). 
96 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); see, e.g., Papachristou v. 
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165-71 (1972) (analyzing the constitutionality of a 
vagrancy law for vagueness).  The Papachristou Court held the ordinance unconstitu-
tional: 
 This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it  “fails to give a 
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is 
forbidden by the statute” and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic ar-
rests and convictions. 
 . . . . 
 The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder are not in 
business and not alerted to the regulatory schemes of vagrancy laws; and we 
assume they would have no understanding of their meaning and impact if 
they read them. . . . 
 The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which by modern stan-
dards are normally innocent. 
Id. at 162-63 (citations omitted).  However, the vagueness doctrine does not necessarily 
advance this rationale: 
[T]he actual administration of the vagueness doctrine belies [the fair notice] 
rationale.  For one thing, the kind of notice required is entirely formal.  Pub-
lication of a statute’s text always suffices; the government need make no fur-
ther effort to apprise the people of the content of the law.  In the context of 
civil litigation, where notice is taken seriously, publication is a last resort; more 
effective means must be employed wherever possible.  It may be objected that 
no more effective means is possible where the intended recipient of the in-
formation is the entire populace or some broad segment thereof, rather than 
an identifiable individual or entity.  But this argument at most explains why 
publication should sometimes suffice; it does not explain why no further obli-
gation is ever considered.  Nor does it explain why publication in some official 
document, no matter how inaccessible, is all that is required.  In short, the fair 
warning requirement of the vagueness doctrine is not structured to achieve 
actual notice of the content of the penal law. 
Jeffries, supra note 13, at 206-07 (footnotes omitted). 
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2.  Deterrence 
By describing the distinction between permissible and impermissible 
conduct in evaluative terms, standards allow the addressees to make in-
dividualized judgments about the substantive offensiveness or nonoffen-
siveness of their own actual or contemplated conduct. . . . [P]ersons will 
be deterred from engaging in borderline conduct and encouraged to 
substitute less offensive types of conduct.
97
Courts have held that laws that are “so vague that effective 
deterrence via criminal enforcement is wholly impracticable” are 
void.98  There is also the danger that a vague statute will overdeter.  
“[W]here a vague statute abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First 
Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of those 
freedoms.  Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to steer far 
wider of the unlawful zone than if the boundaries of the forbidden 
areas were clearly marked.”99  “Because First Amendment freedoms 
need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area 
only with narrow specificity.”100
97 Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 385 (1985); cf. Isaac 
Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 
257, 263 (1974) (arguing that vagueness-related uncertainty about legal sanctions re-
sults in inefficient outcomes).  But cf. Tom Baker et al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law:  
An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443, 468-71 (2004) (arguing that an empiri-
cal study of the benefits of uncertainty in the law in the context of criminal sanctions 
shows an increase in deterrence). 
98 Cuevas v. Royal D’Iberville Hotel, 498 So. 2d 346, 358 (Miss. 1986) (striking 
down a statute that applied “to any person who is visibly intoxicated”). 
99 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109 (footnotes, alterations, and quotation marks omitted).  
“[T]here is the danger that the state will get away with more inhibitory regulation than 
it has a constitutional right to impose, because persons at the fringes of amenability to 
regulation will rather obey than run the risk of erroneous constitutional judgment.”  
Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 80 
(1960). 
100 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).  As LaFave and Scott note: 
This bolstering of the void-for-vagueness doctrine by the “breathing space” ar-
gument . . . is somewhat different than a direct attack upon a statute on the 
ground that it violates constitutional guarantees of the First Amendment.  
Criminal statutes . . . may be attacked on the latter basis as well, but the cir-
cumstances in which this may be successfully done are in some respects more 
limited.  Thus, when a statute is challenged on this basis it is generally re-
quired that the party making the challenge establish that the statute actually 
infringes upon his own constitutional rights.  This is not so when it is alleged 
that the statute is vague and that it thus does not afford sufficient “breathing 
space.”  Such an attack is permitted even though the person making the attack 
fails to demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute 
drawn with the requisite narrow specificity. 
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 2.3(d), at 134 (footnotes omitted). 
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3.  Reserving the Criminalization Authority to the Legislature 
 It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large 
enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step 
inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set 
at large.  This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legis-
lative department of government.
101
“A law whose meaning can only be guessed at remits the actual 
task of defining criminal misconduct to retroactive judicial 
decisionmaking.”102  “A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy 
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc 
and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application.”103
4.  Avoiding Discretion Increases the Potential for Abuse and Reduces 
the Likely Uniformity of Application 
[W]hen the language being construed is subject to only one plausible in-
terpretation or “fair reading,” uniformity of application and unantici-
pated costs will dwindle in significance.  However, when the language is 
vague and subject to many reasonable interpretations, uniformity of ap-
plication and the unanticipated costs associated with each interpretation 
will become more telling.104
Significantly, “if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be 
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply 
 
101 United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875). 
102 Jeffries, supra note 13, at 196. 
103 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09. 
104 Freedman v. Texaco Marine Servs., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 580, 583-84 (E.D. Tex. 
1995).  In Kolender v. Lawson, the Supreme Court observed that, although the vague-
ness doctrine “focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement,” its 
most important aspect “‘is not actual notice, but . . . the requirement that a legislature 
establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.’” 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983) 
(quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).  Kolender held unconstitutionally 
vague a California penal statute that required persons who loitered or wandered on 
the streets to provide a “credible and reliable” identification and to account for their 
presence when detained by a police officer.  Id. at 360-61.  Finding that the “credible 
and reliable” standard provided insufficient particularity for officers to “determine 
whether the suspect has complied with the subsequent identification requirement,” 
the Court ruled the statute “unconstitutionally vague on its face because it encourages 
arbitrary enforcement.” Id. at 361.  The statute was said to be merely “a convenient 
tool” for discriminatory or abusive enforcement.  Id. at 360 (citation and quotation 
marks omitted). 
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them.”105  Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guide-
lines, a criminal statute may permit “a standardless sweep [that] allows 
policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal pred-
ilections.”106
G.  The Rationales 
As the foregoing analysis makes clear, the legality doctrines are 
supported by a number of interlocking rationales:  primarily the socie-
tal interests in providing fair notice; increasing compliance, such as 
through deterrent effect; reserving criminalization decisions to the 
legislature; increasing uniformity in the treatment of similar cases; 
105 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.  For example, 
[p]rosecutors in this country have enormous discretion, and their decisions 
are largely unconstrained by law.  Our chief (and admittedly inadequate) re-
sponse to the potential for abuse is to tighten the procedural criteria for a 
criminal conviction, so that prosecutors, though largely uncontrolled in decid-
ing not to proceed, at least are subject to a careful post-audit of their decisions 
to begin prosecution.  The vagueness doctrine provides a secondary constraint 
by eliminating laws that invite manipulation—specifically, those for which the 
individualized adjudication of guilt is an unusually inadequate check on po-
lice and prosecutorial action. 
Jeffries, supra note 13, at 197. 
106 Goguen, 415 U.S. at 575; see also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 
156, 162 (1972) (holding an ordinance unconstitutionally vague because it had the po-
tential for too much police discretion).  For example, the vagueness doctrine’s empha-
sis on limiting discretion 
helps explain why it is so often invoked against “street-cleaning” statutes—
local ordinances directed against some form of public nuisance, typically in-
volving trivial misconduct, usually with no specifically identifiable victim, and 
carrying minor penalties.  Laws of this sort are often found vague largely be-
cause they lend themselves to informal social control of undesirables. 
Jeffries, supra note 13, at 215-16; see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60-61 
(1999) (holding that a loitering statute giving officers absolute discretion to determine 
what activities constitute loitering violates the requirement that a legislature establish 
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement).  “The objection to a vague statute . . . 
is akin to a claim of denial of equal protection in law enforcement, although it may 
more appropriately be said to rest upon the notion that the language of the statute is 
so uncertain that arbitrariness in its enforcement might not be detected.” LAFAVE & 
SCOTT, supra note 3, § 2.3(c), at 132 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. 
v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 689-90 (1968) (noting that a vague statute fails to pro-
vide the guidance necessary for citizens to conform their actions to the law, for law en-
forcement to administer the law, and for judges to perform effective judicial review).  
“Some risk of arbitrary enforcement is present, however, even with the most carefully 
drafted statute.”  LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 2.3(c), at 132 n.47; see Frank J. Rem-
ington & Victor G. Rosenblum, The Criminal Law and the Legislative Process, 1960 U. ILL. 
L.F. 481, 488-89 (explaining that it is impossible to write a completely unambiguous 
statute without making the administration of the law too complicated). 
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and reducing the potential for the abuse of discretion.  Each in its 
own way contributes to the same goal of structuring a particular rela-
tionship between the individual and the government in the formula-
tion and application of penal rules. 
1.  Providing Fair Notice 
Fairness requires that an actor have at least an opportunity to find 
out what the criminal law prohibits.  Actual notice is not required for 
liability; it is enough that the prohibition has been lawfully enacted.  
By the same token, an actor’s actual knowledge that the conduct is 
sought to be prohibited and punished does not vitiate a legality-based 
defense.  The concern of the legality principle is procedural fairness, 
not blamelessness.  As Justice Holmes put it in McBoyle v. United States : 
 Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text 
of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning 
should be given to the world in language that the common world will 
understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.  To 
make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear.
107
The fair notice rationale supports all of the legality doctrines.108
107 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931). 
108 See supra text accompanying notes 11, 23-24, 26, 43-44, 60-62, 75, 95-96 (ex-
plaining how the fair notice rationale supports each legality doctrine). 
 The principle that prospective criminals should be given fair warning is the 
underlying basis of [many] important rules of criminal law:  (1) the rule that 
vague criminal statutes violate due process; (2) the federal and state constitu-
tional prohibitions against ex post facto laws; and (3) the decision of the 
courts or legislatures of a number of states and of the federal government that 
there are no common law crimes. 
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 2.2(d), at 108 n.26 (internal cross-references omit-
ted). 
[T]he rationale of notice is nicely comprehensive.  It is a theme shared by le-
gality, vagueness, and strict construction, uniting all three doctrines in a 
common front against unfair surprise.  Thus, judicial crime creation is bad 
because it is retrospective; notice of illegality may effectively be denied.  Simi-
larly, indefinite statutes are objectionable because they are uninformative; it is 
difficult to tell what conduct is proscribed.  And when the statute is not vague 
but only ambiguous, strict construction steps in to restrict its meaning to that 
which should have been foreseen; laws that in general give fair warning are 
conformed in detail to the warning given. 
Jeffries, supra note 13, at 206. 
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2.  Gaining Compliance 
There is little hope that the criminal law can influence people’s 
conduct if it is not clear what conduct is and is not permissible.109  The 
mechanism of influence may be through the deterrent effect of the 
threat of official punishment110 or the effect of influence of friends, 
family, and others guided by a criminal law with moral credibility.111  
The compliance rationale extends to the reverse situation as well:  
avoiding a deterrent effect on conduct that is not prohibited.  That is, 
persons may refrain from engaging in lawful conduct if they 
mistakenly assume that the conduct may be included within a 
prohibition.  Such forbearance may not be a problem in many or even 
most cases, but it can be in some, as where a vague prohibition may be 
interpreted to prohibit speech protected by the First Amendment.112
3.  Reserving the Criminalization Authority to the Legislature 
The legality principle is also thought to help preserve the crimi-
nalization authority to the legislature, which is the most representative 
branch of government.  This rationale directly supports the abolition 
of common law offenses and the prohibition of the judicial creation of 
offenses.  It also supports, in a less obvious manner, the invalidation of 
vague statutes, because vague statutes are de facto delegations of 
criminalization authority to the courts.  Where vagueness exists, courts 
are left to provide the specificity the legislature has not.113
109 See supra text accompanying note 12 (explaining why vague statutes do not af-
fect people’s actions); see also GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW:  THE GENERAL 
PART § 184, at 575 (2d ed. 1961) (noting that if a citizen cannot ascertain the law be-
fore acting, punishment for breaking the law has no deterrent effect). 
110 But there is some reason to believe that the deterrent effect is not as likely as is 
generally assumed.  See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the 
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules:  At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 953-
56 (2003) (explaining that the criminal law system does not deter as much as is com-
monly thought).  See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law 
Deter?  A Behavioral Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004) (analyz-
ing behavioral science to show that criminal law, in itself, does not deter criminal be-
havior). 
111 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 
453, 468-77 (1997), for a general description of the significance of social group ap-
proval in an individual’s decision to obey the law. 
112 See supra text accompanying notes 99-100 (discussing the risk that a vague stat-
ute could chill free speech). 
113 See supra text accompanying notes 13-14, 27-28, 46-47, 101-03 (noting how 
vague statutes shift the criminalization authority to the judiciary). 
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4.  Increasing Uniformity in Application 
The legality principle’s preference for clear and precise liability 
rules also serves to reduce the need for discretionary judgments and 
to increase uniformity in application.  Reducing individual discretion 
is useful because with discretion inevitably comes disparity based upon 
the inherent differences among decision makers.  Disparity in 
application is invited by the use of common law and vague offenses, 
which, by virtue of their broad nature and unwritten form, commonly 
allow different decision makers to apply them differently to similar 
cases.  Even more clearly, the authority of judges to create offenses 
allows the exercise of judicial discretion on the most fundamental 
matter:  the formulation of rules by which liability is to be 
determined.114
5.  Reducing the Potential for Abuse of Discretion 
Room for the exercise of discretion also can give opportunity to 
malevolent influences such as racism, sexism, and the like.  Thus, by 
introducing the need for the exercise of discretion, an unclear prohi-
bition can create the potential for abuse by police officers, prosecu-
tors, and others with decision-making authority.  In Papachristou v. City 
of Jacksonville, for example, police officers arrested interracial couples, 
charging them with a variety of vague offenses, such as “vagrancy,” 
“loitering,” and “disorderly loitering on street.”115  The Supreme 
Court reversed the convictions, finding that the vagueness of the 
114 See supra text accompanying notes 15, 29 (discussing the negative impact of 
common law crimes on the uniformity of laws); see also State v. Ragland, 519 A.2d 1361, 
1371 (N.J. 1986) (noting the fundamental principle of Western democracy of a “gov-
ernment of laws and not of men,” and that to satisfy this principle, all elements of the 
criminal justice system strive toward equal application of the law to all accused). 
The rule of law signifies the constraint of arbitrariness in the exercise of gov-
ernment power.  In the context of the penal law, it means that the agencies of 
official coercion should, to the extent feasible, be guided by rules—that is, by 
openly acknowledged, relatively stable, and generally applicable statements of 
proscribed conduct.  The evils to be retarded are caprice and whim, the mis-
use of government power for private ends, and the unacknowledged reliance 
on illegitimate criteria of selection.  The goals to be advanced are regularity 
and evenhandedness in the administration of justice and accountability in the 
use of government power.  In short, the “rule of law” designates the cluster of 
values associated with conformity to law by government. 
Jeffries, supra note 13, at 212-13. 
115  405 U.S. 156, 158 (1972). 
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statutes encouraged arbitrary convictions as well as arbitrary arrests.116  
As with the uniformity-in-application rationale, the abuse-of-discretion 
rationale supports the prohibition against vagueness, common law 
offenses, and judicial creation of offenses.117
H.  Overlap Among Rationales in Support of Each Doctrine 
It should be apparent, then, that each legality doctrine shares ra-
tionales with every other legality doctrine; hence, the tendency to see 
them as common members within the concept of legality.  The ration-
ales supporting the doctrines might be summarized in this way:118
 
116 Id. at 162, 171 (“The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as majori-
ties, to the poor as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together.”). 
117 See supra text accompanying notes 16, 30-31, 104-06 (demonstrating why the ra-
tionale supports the prohibitions); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 360-61 
(1983) (declaring a statute requiring a lawfully stopped person to provide “credible 
and reliable” identification vague because it confers virtually complete discretion on 
the police); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974) (declaring a statute prohib-
iting contemptuous treatment of the American flag void for vagueness under the Four-
teenth Amendment, because the Constitution “requires legislatures to set reasonably 
clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement” of criminal statutes (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 This risk of abuse in the administration of the law is present in two forms 
when the meaning of a criminal statute is unclear.  One risk is that the law 
may be arbitrarily applied by police and prosecution officials, which the Court 
has recently characterized as “the more important aspect of vagueness doc-
trine.”  The Supreme Court has voided statutes which give the police unlim-
ited discretion, and has evidenced equal concern about laws which furnish 
convenient tools for discriminatory enforcement by prosecuting officials.  The 
other risk is that the law may be so unclear that a trial court cannot properly 
instruct the jury.  A statute is unconstitutionally vague when it leaves judges 
and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohib-
ited and what is not in each particular case. 
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 2.3(c), at 132 (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358); see, 
e.g., Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966) (declaring a Pennsylvania 
statute allowing a jury to assess costs against an acquitted defendant unconstitutionally 
vague); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) (holding that a 
statute that did not forbid a “specific or definite act” was unconstitutionally vague be-
cause it did not provide an “ascertainable standard of guilt”). 
118 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules:  On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 664 tbl. (1984), for a different formulation of the 
relationships among conduct and decision rules and legality rationales. 
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Table 1:  Rationales of Legality Doctrines 
 Legality 
 Rationale 
 
 
Legality 
Doctrine 
Fair 
notice 
Gaining 
compliance, 
as through 
effective  
deterrence 
Reserving 
criminaliz-
ation  
authority to 
legislature 
Uniformity 
in  
application 
Reducing 
potential 
for abuse 
of  
discretion 
R U L E S  R E L A T I N G  T O  J U D G E S  
Abolition of com-
mon law penal rules 
X X X X X 
Prohibition of  judi-
cially created penal 
rules 
X X X X X 
Special rules for the 
construction of  
penal statutes 
X X X 
  
Bar to retroactive 
application of judi-
cial interpretation of 
penal rules 
X X 
   
 
R U L E S  R E L A T I N G  T O  S T A T U T E S  
Prohibition of ex 
post facto penal 
rules 
X X X   
Voiding penal rules 
because of vagueness 
X X X X X 
      
What has been presented in this Part is the traditional view of le-
gality, which remains accurate today, so far as it goes.  Yet despite the 
detail, it will become clear that this view represents only part of the 
picture of how and why we care about legality.  The next Part intro-
duces a distinction—between ex ante rules of conduct and ex post 
principles of adjudication—that will provide an important basis for 
reenvisioning the legality doctrines and their rationales, which will in 
turn suggest a refinement of our views on how the legality doctrines 
should be applied. 
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II.  TWO FUNCTIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW: 
EX ANTE ANNOUNCING RULES OF CONDUCT AND 
EX POST ADJUDICATING VIOLATIONS OF THOSE RULES 
Criminal law rules serve two sometimes competing functions.  
First, they must define the conduct that is prohibited or required by 
the criminal law.  Such “rules of conduct” provide ex ante direction to 
the members of the community as to the conduct that must be 
avoided or must be performed, or that is permitted, upon pain of 
criminal sanction.  Where a violation of the rules of conduct occurs, 
the criminal law must take on the role of adjudication:  determining 
whether the offender is to be held criminally liable for the violation 
and, if she is to be held liable, then determining at what general grade 
of punishment.  This second function, setting the minimum condi-
tions for and extent of liability, is performed by the adjudication 
process.  It assesses ex post whether an actor has violated a rule of 
conduct and is sufficiently blameworthy for the violation to be held 
criminally liable for it.119
119 We are indebted to Meir Dan-Cohen for reintroducing the distinction into 
modern criminal theory debate in his classic article, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules:  
On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, supra note 118, at 634-36, 667-78 (tracing the 
history of the distinction between “conduct rules” and “decision rules” in the legal 
process).  The distinction was first recognized in Talmudic law.  See DAVID DAUBE, 
FORMS OF ROMAN LEGISLATION 24 (1956) (“There came a period in Talmudic law 
when it was assumed that the Bible had two separate statutes for each crime, one to 
prohibit it and one to lay down the penalty.”).  Jeremy Bentham observed the compet-
ing functions of criminal law: 
A law confining itself to the creation of an offence, and a law commanding a 
punishment to be administered in case of the commission of such an offence, 
are two distinct laws; not parts (as they seem to have been generally accounted 
hitherto) of one and the same law.  The acts they command are altogether 
different; the persons they are addressed to are altogether different.  Instance, 
Let no man steal ; and, Let the judge cause whoever is convicted of stealing to be 
hanged. 
 They might be styled; the former, a simply imperative law; the other a punitory:  
but the punitory, if it commands the punishment to be inflicted, and does not 
merely permit it, is as truly imperative as the other . . . . 
JEREMY BENTHAM, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), in A 
FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION 113, 430 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948). 
 Dan-Cohen’s article also explores the potential for conflict between these two 
functions of criminal law.  See Dan-Cohen, supra note 118, at 632 (describing the 
conflicting messages conduct rules and decision rules may send).  For a further 
discussion on the distinction between conduct and decision rules, see GERALD J. 
POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 403-08, 448-52 (1986) 
(describing the interrelationship between Bentham’s theories of law and 
adjudication); JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM:  AN INTRODUCTION TO A 
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While the distinction between these two functions—announcing 
rules of conduct ex ante and adjudicating liability ex post—is central 
to the operation of the criminal law, it is commonly ignored by cur-
rent doctrine and its structure.  Some elements of offenses serve one 
function while other elements serve other functions.  Similarly, some 
general defenses serve one function while other defenses serve other 
functions. 
A.  Doctrines Announcing the Rules of Conduct Ex Ante 
As a group, the rule articulation doctrines state both prohibitions 
and duties.  The law’s prohibitions concern not only conduct under 
certain circumstances but also conduct that creates a certain risk.  
Most of the criminal law’s rule articulation function is performed by 
the conduct and circumstance elements of offense definitions.  Taken 
together, these elements give an account of what a person must or 
must not do in order to obey the criminal law.120  They are not, 
however, a complete statement of the rules of conduct.  The law 
recognizes that in some instances a greater harm can be avoided or a 
greater good can be achieved by allowing a person to violate a 
prohibition.  Burning another person’s property is a violation but it is 
THEORY OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 154-56 (2d ed. 1980) (exploring issues concerning the 
distinction between decision rules and conduct rules); PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE 
AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW pt. 3 (1997) [hereinafter ROBINSON, STRUCTURE & 
FUNCTION] (discussing the three primary functions of criminal law:  rules, liability, and 
grading); Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 
857, 876 (1994) [hereinafter Robinson, Functional Analysis] (noting the overlap 
between criminal law’s functions); Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of 
Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 730-31 (1990) [hereinafter Robinson, Rules of 
Conduct] (explaining the distinction between rules of conduct and principles of 
adjudication). 
120 In addition to these “primary violations” are what may be called “secondary vio-
lations.”  Secondary violations are not independent prohibitions but rather prohibi-
tions defined by reference to the primary rules.  Not only are persons bound to avoid 
conduct that would be a violation of a primary prohibition, but also:  “No person shall 
engage in conduct that assists another person in conduct that would be a violation [of 
the rules of conduct].”  Or:  “No person shall attempt to engage in conduct that would 
constitute a violation [of the rules of conduct].”  Thus, additional aspects of the crimi-
nal law’s rule articulation function are performed by the conduct and circumstance 
elements of such secondary prohibitions as complicity and inchoate offenses.  See ROB-
INSON, STRUCTURE & FUNCTION, supra note 119, at 128-41 (explaining how four condi-
tions of culpability—present conduct intention, present circumstance culpability, fu-
ture result culpability, and future conduct intention—extend culpability to secondary 
prohibitions including conspiracy and assistance crimes); Robinson, Functional Analy-
sis, supra note 119, at 867 (“[N]either may one assist or attempt or solicit or conspire to 
commit such a violation.”). 
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to be tolerated (even encouraged) if the burning acts as a firebreak to 
save a town.  Striking another person without consent is a violation 
but is to be tolerated if done by a police officer if necessary to 
overcome resistance to a lawful arrest.  These doctrines of justification 
are permissive only; they tell people when they will be permitted to 
violate a rule of conduct.121
Unfortunately, current criminal law doctrine commonly does a 
poor job at this most important function:  telling people what they 
can, must, and must not do, under threat of criminal sanction.  The 
rules of lawful conduct frequently are unclear even to actors who are 
intelligent, thoughtful, and informed.  Frequently, neither existing 
statements of the law nor our process of public adjudication effectively 
communicates the rules that define lawful conduct.122
B.  Doctrines Adjudicating Violations of the Rules of Conduct Ex Post 
Where a rule of conduct is violated, the criminal law takes on its 
separate function of deciding whether the violation should be 
punished.  For example, the special condemnatory nature of criminal 
law may require that inadvertent and unavoidable violations not be 
punished.  If the actor’s conduct is blameless, liability ought not be 
imposed, even though the actor may well have caused the harm or evil 
described by the rules of conduct.  Further, the moral basis of the 
criminal law is such that liability is properly reserved for violations of 
sufficient seriousness committed with sufficient blameworthiness to 
justify the condemnation of criminal liability.123
To ensure this minimum level of blameworthiness, the law 
requires proof of an actor’s culpability as to each element of an 
offense, typically at least recklessness as to each objective element.  
Thus, an actor must be aware of a substantial risk that his conduct may 
cause another’s death or obstruct a highway, or that the property he is 
taking may belong to another.124  In addition, the minimum require-
121 For a further discussion of the doctrines of justification and their relation to 
the doctrines of criminalization, see Robinson, Rules of Conduct, supra note 119, at 740-
42. 
122 See ROBINSON, STRUCTURE & FUNCTION, supra note 119, ch. 7 (discussing the 
inability of the average citizen to comprehend the confusing rules of conduct found in 
modern codes). 
123 As the Model Penal Code suggests, one of “[t]he general purposes of the provi-
sions governing the definition of offenses [is] . . . to safeguard conduct that is without 
fault from condemnation as criminal.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1)(c) (1962). 
124 This preference for recklessness as the normal minimum culpability required is 
expressed by provisions like the Model Penal Code’s § 2.02(3), which “reads in” reck-
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ments of blameworthiness are set by such doctrines as the voluntari-
ness requirement in commission offenses, the capacity requirement 
for omission liability, and the requirement in possession offenses that 
the actor know of the possession for a period of time sufficient to 
terminate possession.125  These requirements are designed to ensure 
that the actor could have avoided the violation.  Only if this is true can 
the actor be blamed for not doing so. 
The general excuse defenses—insanity, immaturity, involuntary 
intoxication, and duress—serve a function analogous to the 
voluntariness doctrines noted above.  While our assumptions of sanity, 
maturity, sobriety, and absence of coercion normally are correct, in 
the unusual case an actor may suffer a disability, the effect of which 
may be such that she could not reasonably have been expected to 
have avoided the violation.126
While the culpability requirements in offenses and excuse 
defenses are doctrinally quite distinct, they serve similar functions.  
We assume, from past experience, that most actors have normal 
capacities to understand their surroundings and control their 
conduct.  It is the unusual case, frequently where the actor suffers 
some disability, where this assumption is unwarranted and where an 
excuse defense applies.  In contrast, it is common that an actor may 
be understandably mistaken about some characteristic or circum-
stance of his or her conduct; that is, it is common that an actor may 
not have the culpability required by an offense’s definition.  These 
common possibilities for non-culpable violations are what the 
culpability requirements are designed to exclude.127
lessness whenever an offense definition is silent on the required culpability as to a par-
ticular element.  Other requirements for ensuring an actor’s blameworthiness are in 
provisions outside of the offense definition.  The de minimis defense, for example, 
bars liability if the actor’s conduct caused the harm or evil prohibited by the offense 
“only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction.”  MODEL PE-
NAL CODE § 2.12(2) (1962). 
125 See id. § 2.01(1), (4) (establishing the voluntary act requirement and stating 
that possession is only an act if the possessor had sufficient time to rid himself of the 
thing). 
126 See, e.g., id. §§ 2.08, 4.01, 4.10 (defining the disabilities of intoxication, mental 
disease or defect, and immaturity, respectively).  The mistake excuses are also of this 
category, but their excusing conditions operate in a different way.  See ROBINSON, supra 
note 41, § 9.5, at 545 (analyzing the peculiarities of the mistake excuse). 
127 A second aspect of the principles of adjudication, if it is determined that there 
is to be liability, is determining the extent of the punishment:  the grading function.  
In addition to the extent of the harm or evil of an offense—defined by the rule articu-
lation doctrines—an actor’s deserved punishment will depend upon, inter alia, his 
level of culpability.  Culpability greater than the minimum required for liability fre-
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C.  Summary 
The functions of the various criminal law rules can be summarized 
as follows:128
Figure 1 
Prohibited 
conduct and  
affirmative  
duties  
(contained in 
offense  
definitions) 
Objective 
requirements of 
justification  
defenses (i.e.,  
circumstances 
justifying  
conduct that is 
otherwise  
prohibited) 
P R I N C I P L E S  O F  A D J U D I C A T I O N  
R U L E S  O F  C O N D U C T
Culpability  
requirements  
Excuse defenses 
 
 
In determining which doctrines perform which function, the 
previous discussion groups the doctrines as if each serves exclusively 
one function or another.  In fact, the interrelation among the 
doctrines is one of cumulative reliance.  A complete description of the 
minimum requirements for liability requires not only reference to the 
doctrines serving the liability function but also to the doctrines serving 
quently increases the actor’s deserved punishment.  For example, purposely causing a 
death is more culpable than recklessly doing so, which is more culpable than negli-
gently doing so.  Thus, those culpability elements of offense definitions that require 
more than the minimum required for liability serve a grading function by distinguish-
ing the case of greater culpability from the case of lesser culpability.  Result elements 
and causation requirements also serve a grading function.  Thus, where the elements 
of an offense definition are not satisfied only because of the absence of a required re-
sult (or the result is not attributable to the actor because of the absence of an adequate 
causal connection), the actor will be liable for an offense, specifically an attempt, even 
if the code defines no other lesser included offense.  See ROBINSON, STRUCTURE & 
FUNCTION, supra note 119, pt. 3 (setting forth the functional structure of criminal law, 
including the rules of conduct and the doctrines of liability and grading). 
128 For a more detailed analysis, see id.; in particular, see id. at 141 fig. (identifying 
the three principle functions of criminal law—the rule articulation function, the liabil-
ity function, and the grading function-—and showing how they interrelate). 
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the rule articulation function.  In other words, one prerequisite of 
liability is a violation of the rules of conduct.  (Similarly, the criminal 
law’s grading function cannot be performed by reference to the 
doctrines of grading alone.  The doctrines of liability are part of the 
grading function because they define the minimum grade 
requirements.)  Thus, the doctrines serve different functions and have 
continuing and cumulative roles as the law’s inquiry moves from rule 
articulation to liability to grading.129
D.  Current Law’s Failure to Distinguish Criminal Law Rules 
 According to Function 
Current criminal law often does poorly in its two primary 
functions because it fails to distinguish between the two.130  For 
example, it frequently obscures its conduct rules by overlaying them 
with complex culpability and grading judgments.131  It mixes conduct 
rules with excuses by defining justification defenses subjectively, 
thereby obscuring the conduct rule meant to be announced by the 
objective justification defense.132  It obscures conduct rules that define 
prohibited risks by mixing them with liability rules that define 
culpable risk-taking.133
The present verdict system is another unnecessary source of 
confusion.  The law’s general “not guilty” acquittal does not tell us 
whether (1) the defendant’s conduct was not a violation of the rules 
of conduct or (2) it was a violation of the rules of conduct, but a 
blameless one.  Yet these two situations say opposite things about 
whether the conduct in the case at hand will be permitted under the 
129 See id. at 140 fig. (illustrating the relationships between these three functions:  
doctrines of grading encompass doctrines of liability, which in turn encompass doc-
trines of rule articulation). 
130 For a general analysis and discussion, see Robinson, Functional Analysis, supra 
note 119, at 876-900 (identifying doctrinal shortcomings in criminal law and linking 
them to a lack of sensitivity regarding the uniqueness of each criminal law function). 
131 See id. at 876-78 (asserting that such obscurity in criminal codes forces the aver-
age person to look to their own moral intuitions to determine the rules of conduct). 
132 See id. at 880-82 (citing justification defenses made ambiguous by their mixture 
of subjective and objective elements). 
133 See id. at 882-89 (arguing that a subjective approach must be taken in using the 
language of risk in establishing liability rules); Paul H. Robinson, Prohibited Risks and 
Culpable Disregard or Inattentiveness:  Challenge and Confusion in the Formulation of 
Risk-Creation Offenses, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 367, 368 (2003), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol4/iss1/art7 (asserting that the Model Penal 
Code’s mixture of conduct rules and adjudication rules led to an “inappropriate” sub-
jectivization of risk-related offenses). 
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same circumstances in the future:  the no-violation acquittal condones 
the conduct, the blameless-violation acquittal condemns it.  Thus, in 
each situation the adjudication of acquittal serves only to blur the rule 
of conduct rather than to reinforce it.134
These are just a few of the ways in which current law fails to 
effectively perform its two functions by failing to distinguish the two.135  
But the most troublesome difficulty of this sort concerns the law’s 
failure to distinguish rules of conduct from principles of adjudication 
in the conceptualization and formulation of the legality doctrines. 
III.  LEGALITY AND THE TWO FUNCTIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 
Recall the five overlapping rationales of legality doctrines, sum-
marized in Table 1.136  The rationales appear in a different light when 
considered from the perspective of the criminal law’s distinct func-
tions—ex ante announcing rules of conduct and ex post adjudicating 
violations—reviewed in Part II.  It is now apparent that some of the le-
gality rationales apply to one of the criminal law’s functions and some 
to the other.  Thus, to most effectively advance their rationales, the 
legality doctrines may need to apply differently to those criminal law 
rules that define the rules of conduct than to those criminal law rules 
that adjudicate violations of the rules. 
The five rationales commonly offered in support of the legality 
principle do not apply evenly to the two functions of criminal law.  
Providing fair notice and gaining compliance, including providing ef-
134 See Robinson, Functional Analysis, supra note 119, at 878-80 (invoking the case of 
Rodney King to demonstrate the possible difficulties in the interpretation of jury ver-
dicts).  For proposals for reform of jury verdicts that would avoid this problem, see 
ROBINSON, STRUCTURE & FUNCTION, supra note 119, at 204-07 (proposing the creation 
of “exculpatory” and “non-exculpatory” acquittals). 
135 For other examples, see Robinson, Functional Analysis, supra note 119, at 889-91 
(criticizing the Model Penal Code for retaining common law elements with respect to 
attempt liability).  For additional discussion of the difficulties created by the law’s fail-
ure to distinguish rules of conduct from principles of adjudication, and of proposals 
for reform, see also ROBINSON, STRUCTURE & FUNCTION, supra note 119, chs. 7-9 (sug-
gesting that criminal codes take an objective stance of defining justification defenses, 
that attempt liability be reformulated, and that the grading function be reassessed); 
Paul H. Robinson et al., Making Criminal Codes Functional:  A Code of Conduct and a Code 
of Adjudication, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 304, 304-05 (1996) (analyzing the con-
flicting needs of adjudicators and the public); Robinson, Rules of Conduct, supra note 
119, at 757 (reiterating the author’s belief that criminal law doctrine should be refor-
mulated to meet the needs of both the rules of conduct and the principles of adjudica-
tion). 
136 Supra p. 368. 
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fective deterrence and avoiding overdeterrence (the “chilling effect”), 
strictly address the ex ante rule articulation function.  These ration-
ales are designed to ensure that the rules of conduct can be known 
and understood and can guide individuals to remain law-abiding.  In 
contrast, increasing uniformity in application and reducing the poten-
tial for abuse of discretion are rationales that apply directly to the ad-
judication function.  They urge interpretations and applications of the 
principles of adjudication that avoid unnecessary discretion.  The ra-
tionale of reserving the criminalization authority to the legislature ap-
plies to both functions.  To summarize: 
 
Table 2:  Rationales as Related to Ex Ante Rules Legality and 
 Ex Post Adjudication Legality 
 
Rationale: 
As Relates to Rules Legality and 
Adjudication Legality: 
1.  Providing fair notice 
2.  Gaining compliance with criminal 
law rules, including effective  
deterrence and avoiding  
overdeterrence  
relate to ex ante function of 
announcing rules of conduct 
(rules legality applies) 
3.  Reserving the criminalization  
authority to the legislature relates to both 
4.  Increasing uniformity in  
application 
5.  Reducing the potential for abuse 
of discretion 
relate to ex post function of  
adjudication of rule violations  
(adjudication legality applies) 
 
Thus, both to best advance the legality rationales and to best 
perform the criminal law’s functions, the legality doctrines ought to 
apply differently depending upon the function of the criminal law 
rule to which they are being applied.137  When applied to the conduct 
and circumstance elements of offense definitions and to the objective 
justification defenses, one set of rationales applies and urges one kind 
of application of the legality doctrines.  When applied to the 
culpability element of offense definitions and excuse defenses, a 
 
137 Recall that different rationales support different legality doctrines.  See Table 
1, supra p. 368, for a summary of how each legality doctrine relies on the rationales 
that further the two functions of criminal law. 
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different set of rationales applies and urges a different kind of 
application of the legality doctrines. 
In truth, what traditionally has been thought of as a single legality 
principle is in proper practice two distinct principles.138  The first, the 
principle of “rules legality,” (1) seeks primarily to advance the ex ante 
rules rationales of fair notice and gaining compliance, and (2) applies 
to those criminal law rules that serve to announce the rules of con-
duct.  Therefore, these two rationales, together with that of reserving 
the criminalization authority to the legislature, should govern the ap-
plication of legality doctrines to the conduct and circumstance ele-
ments of offense definitions—the definitions of prohibitions and du-
ties—and to justification defenses. 
In contrast, the second, the principle of “adjudication legality,” 
(1) seeks primarily to advance the ex post adjudication rationales of 
increasing uniformity and reducing the potential for abuse by avoid-
ing unnecessary discretion, and (2) applies to those criminal law rules 
that serve to adjudicate violations of the rules of conduct.  Therefore, 
these two rationales, together with that of reserving the criminaliza-
tion authority to the legislature, should govern the application of le-
gality doctrines to the culpability requirements of offense definitions 
and to excuse defenses. 
IV.  APPLYING LEGALITY DOCTRINES TO SERVE THEIR FUNCTION: 
  RULES LEGALITY VERSUS ADJUDICATION LEGALITY 
As may be apparent from the discussion above, the effective op-
eration of the rules of conduct calls for a somewhat different drafting 
form than one would use for the drafting of the principles of adjudi-
cation.  The rules rationales of the legality principle would have the 
rules of conduct formulated to maximize fair notice and effective de-
terrence and to minimize overdeterrence of protected activities.  For 
example, objective and simple criteria might be much preferred in 
the rules of conduct, for these rules generally are directed to the gen-
eral public, who have no special training or background in the law 
and who must apply the rules in the course of their everyday lives.  At 
the same time, there is realistically a limit to how much detail the av-
erage person can be expected to know and apply in guiding her daily 
conduct.  Thus, one might tolerate simplified rules if necessary to 
make feasible a quick and untrained application. 
138 The notion of two distinct legality principles was suggested in ROBINSON, supra 
note 41, § 2.2, at 85 (distinguishing legality in rule articulation and adjudication). 
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In contrast, the adjudication rationales of the legality principle 
would formulate the doctrines of adjudication—those that assess the 
minimum conditions of liability and set the range of punishment—to 
maximize uniformity in application to similar cases and to minimize 
the potential for abuse of discretion.  For example, a high degree of 
specificity might be desirable even if it created a degree of complexity 
that would be unreasonable to expect the public to master.  The 
special training of decision makers and the more contemplative pace 
of the adjudication process means that greater complexity can be 
tolerated.  At the same time, especially with the use of a jury system for 
adjudication, the rules may be formulated to call upon normative 
judgments about the principles of justice that are shared among the 
community.139
Beyond such matters of general drafting form, consider precisely 
how the two forms of legality—rules legality and adjudication legal-
ity—translate into different applications of the six legality doctrines to 
each of the four groups of criminal law rules that are relevant to func-
tion:  the conduct rules of the definition of prohibitions and duties 
and of justification defenses, and the adjudication rules of culpability 
requirements and of excuse defenses.  What can one say about how 
the criminal law’s two functions should affect the formulation and ap-
plication of each of the six legality doctrines? 
A.  Rules Legality:  Conduct and Circumstance Elements of Offense Definitions 
It seems likely that it is this group of criminal law rules that schol-
ars and courts had in mind when first formulating the legality doc-
139 For a general analysis and discussion of the use of different drafting forms de-
pending upon the function of the criminal law rule, see Robinson et al., supra note 
135, at 305 (postulating that distinct codes of conduct and adjudication can be formu-
lated successfully); see also Dan-Cohen, supra note 118, at 652 (discussing the useful 
role of ordinary language in the formulation of offenses seen as conduct rules but ar-
guing that the familiar language can usefully have more complex meanings for law-
yers).  For a discussion of shared community intuitions of justice and their importance 
to the criminal justice process, see generally PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, 
JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME:  COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995) 
(describing the influential role of community views on criminal code development); 
Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is Just?  Co-
ercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839 (2000) [hereinafter Robinson, 
Crime Control] (summarizing how criminal code drafters’ reliance on community views 
yields surprising and non-optimal rule formulations); Paul H. Robinson & Robert 
Kurzban, Intuitions of Justice (Nov. 11, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author) (documenting empirically the existence of shared intuitions of justice and ex-
ploring how and why such shared intuitions developed in humans). 
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trines.  Thus, the traditional applications of those legality doctrines 
described in Part I generally turn out to be suitable, probably because 
they commonly follow the rules legality rationales of providing fair no-
tice and gaining compliance. 
Specifically, common law rules that define prohibited conduct or 
required duties should be invalidated, as should judicial decisions cre-
ating new prohibitions or new duties.  Rules of construction should 
narrowly construe statutory definitions of prohibitions and duties.  
And if, for whatever reason, a judicial interpretation does broaden a 
prohibition or duty, the ruling should not be applied retroactively.  Ex 
post facto application of statutory rules that create or broaden prohi-
bitions or duties should be barred, and vague definitions of prohibi-
tions or duties should be invalidated. 
Let us delay the analysis of the other portion of the rules of con-
duct—general justification defenses—because the treatment of gen-
eral excuse defenses, discussed in the next Part, will provide an inter-
esting point of contrast to justification defenses. 
B.  Adjudication Legality:  Culpability Requirements and Excuse Defenses 
Quite a different picture arises in relation to the doctrines of ad-
judication:  the offense culpability requirements140 and the general 
excuse defenses.  The central rationales here—the adjudication rat-
ionales—look to increasing uniformity in application and to limiting 
the potential for abuse of discretion, without undermining legislative 
decisions on the issues.  These goals are not necessarily concerned 
with providing advance notice and guidance as much as assessing the 
complex issue of the offender’s blameworthiness for a rule violation.  
This can require a good deal of subtlety and complexity.  Luckily, be-
cause the adjudication doctrines are applied after the fact in settings 
that allow careful and thoughtful deliberation, the adjudication rules 
can tolerate greater subtlety and complexity.  Because the goals of 
giving notice and gaining compliance have little application here, 
there is little need to insist on precise and objective formulations. 
On the other hand, the adjudication rules, like the conduct rules, 
must give deference to the legislative will.  But the implications of that 
preference are not necessarily inconsistent with the other rationales.  
It is commonly thought that the legislature generally wishes the 
140 Offense culpability requirements are perhaps described as “culpability de-
fenses,” for they bar liability and punishment for a violation committed without the re-
quired culpability. 
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criminal law to do justice and to avoid injustice.141  Accordingly, it has 
been held that the congressional omission of the element of intent in 
a statute, for example, may be explained by the fact that such 
culpability is so fundamental to criminal liability that the legislature 
must have assumed its requirement was obvious.142  Thus, one might 
141 See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 271 (1952) (reading a culpa-
bility requirement into a theft statute in order to vacate the conviction of a defendant 
who “could not have knowingly or intellectually converted property that he did not 
know could be converted”).  The Court explained: 
 The spirit of the doctrine which denies to the federal judiciary power to 
create crimes forthrightly admonishes that we should not enlarge the reach of 
enacted crimes by constituting them from anything less than the incriminat-
ing components contemplated by the words used in the statute.  And where 
Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition 
and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the 
cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of 
learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the 
judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.  In such case, absence of contrary 
direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as 
a departure from them. 
 We hold that mere omission from [the statute] of any mention of intent will 
not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced. 
Id. at 263.  For another example, see Liparota v. United States, involving a challenge to a 
federal statute prohibiting certain actions with respect to food stamps, where the stat-
ute’s use of “knowingly” could be read either to only modify “uses, transfers, acquires, 
alters, or possesses,” or to also modify the phrase “in any manner not authorized by 
[the statute].”  471 U.S. 419, 420, 426-29 (1985).  The Court was concerned that the 
broader reading would “criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct.”  
Id. at 426.  As such, imposing criminal liability on a food store owner who purchased 
food stamps at below-market prices struck the Court as beyond the intended reach of 
the statute.  Id. at 427. 
142 To eliminate intent would be “a feat of construction [that would] radically . . . 
change the weights and balances in the scales of justice,” and would cause “a manifest 
impairment of the immunities of the individual.”  Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263.  “[F]ar 
more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition 
is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement.”  United States v. U.S. 
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978); see, e.g., State v. Collova, 255 N.W.2d 581, 588 
(1977) (holding that the legislature did not intend to impose a severe penalty for driv-
ing without a valid license without some requirement of guilty knowledge because 
“[t]o inflict substantial punishment on a person who is innocent of any intentional or 
negligent wrongdoing offends the sense of justice and is ineffective”).  In United States 
v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994), the Court read the scienter require-
ment into each element of the federal statute prohibiting the shipping and transport-
ing of child pornography, including the element regarding the child’s age.  The Court 
justified its decision: 
First, . . . [p]ersons do not harbor settled expectations that the contents of 
magazines and film are generally subject to stringent public regulation.  In 
fact, First Amendment constraints presuppose the opposite view. . . . Second, 
[this Court’s expressed] concern with harsh penalties looms equally large . . . . 
 . . . Therefore, the age of the performers is the crucial element separating 
legal innocence from wrongful conduct. 
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assume that legislatures expect courts to shape rules to achieve this 
purpose, unless of course the legislature in some way has itself spoken 
on the issue, as through the enactment of a criminal code that 
purports to be comprehensive. 
What are the specific implications of this adjudication legality 
perspective for application of the six legality doctrines to the 
adjudication rules of culpability and excuse defenses?  Common law 
culpability or excuse defenses ought to be recognized, but only if the 
legislature has neither enacted a criminal code that purports to be 
complete nor in some other way addressed the issue.  Judicial creation 
of a culpability or excuse defense would follow the same pattern:  it 
should be permitted, but only if the legislature has neither enacted a 
criminal code that purports to be complete nor in some other way 
addressed the issue.  By the same token, judicial interpretation of an 
ambiguous defense formulation should be allowed to permit a 
broader culpability or excuse defense, as long as it is not inconsistent 
with a legislative expression of will.  Analogously, retroactive applic-
ation of a judicial interpretation broadening a culpability or excuse 
defense should be permitted, but only if necessary to avoid injustice 
and only if the interpretation is not inconsistent with an expression of 
legislative will.  Because the adjudication rules do not trigger notice 
and compliance rationales, there is little reason to bar a legislature 
from creating and applying culpability and excuse defenses ex post.  
Finally, though the vagueness prohibition still has some value in 
advancing the adjudication rationales of increasing uniformity in 
application and decreasing abuse of discretion, the standard of 
vagueness must, as usual, be adjusted to take account of the extent to 
which precision is possible.143  Particularly in the context of excuse 
defenses, precision often is not possible if the excuses are to perform 
their function.  Culpability defenses are subject to more precise 
definition, but there too some of the issues inevitably must defer to 
normative judgment.144
 . . . . 
 A final canon of statutory construction . . . suggest[s] that a statute com-
pletely bereft of a scienter requirement as to the age of the performers would 
raise serious constitutional doubts. 
Id. at 71-72, 78. 
143 See supra Part I.F (discussing the merits and limitations of the vagueness prohi-
bition). 
144 Cf. Robinson, Crime Control, supra note 139, at 1867 (“[E]very adjudication of-
fers an opportunity to either confirm the exact nature of the norm or to signal a shift 
or refinement of it.”). 
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C.  Rules Legality:  Justification Defenses 
It is worth reaffirming at the start that the criminal law rules at is-
sue here are the objective requirements of the general justification 
defenses:  rules that announce ex ante the special justifying circum-
stances under which a person may do what otherwise is prohibited.  
While some jurisdictions define general justification defenses in an 
objective form,145 others define them in a subjective form, combining 
and confusing the ex ante rules that define justified conduct with the 
ex post adjudication that excuses a mistake as to a justification.146  A 
person who believes he or she is justified, but who in fact is not, 
nonetheless may be exculpated under a mistake-as-to-a-justification 
excuse.  But the role of defining ex ante the circumstances under 
which prohibited conduct in fact is justified—announcing the 
conduct rule for the future—must necessarily be purely objective in 
form:  “A person is justified if [these conditions exist].”  The 
subjective element of a defense—giving a defense if the actor 
“believes” his conduct is justified—serves only the adjudication 
function of excusing a mistaken actor.  That is, the mistake-as-to-a-
justification excuse is not part of the rule articulation function. 
The justification defenses present an interesting situation.  On the 
one hand, as rules of conduct, they are similar in function to the 
objective conduct and circumstance elements of offense definitions, 
but on the other hand, as general exculpatory defenses, they are 
similar in form to excuse defenses.  In this instance, function is more 
important than form.  It is true that the objective justification 
defenses, like excuse defenses, contribute to a determination of an 
actor’s liability, but that is true of all rules of conduct.  The 
adjudication process builds upon the rules of conduct; it does not 
145 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-05-03 to -08 (1997 & Supp. 2005) (including 
justification and excuse defenses in the codification of the state criminal law); see also 
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS:  
A PROPOSED NEW CRIMINAL CODE ch. 6, at 43-54 (1971) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT ON 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS] (proposing that Title 18 of the United States Code include 
provisions allowing for justification and excuse defenses). 
146 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.01–.19 (1962) (formulating justifications for 
otherwise criminal actions and including mistake (§ 3.09) as a possible justification).  
For a general discussion of the virtues of segregating these two issues, see ROBINSON, 
STRUCTURE & FUNCTION, supra note 119, at 100-14 (detailing the complication of justi-
fication defenses and the deeds and reasons justification theories).  That the combin-
ing of these two rules serves two different functions was noted in Part II.D, supra. 
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operate independently of it.147  But, as a rule of conduct, the special 
function of the objective justification defenses is not to exculpate 
blameless offenders but rather to announce ex ante the conduct rules 
that will govern when a person justifiably may do what otherwise is 
prohibited. 
That function means that the legality doctrines ought to apply to 
justification defenses in much the same way as they apply to the 
definition of prohibitions and duties, the other half of the rules of 
conduct.  Any other approach would fail to assure fair notice of what 
is criminal, would fail to accurately signal the criminal law’s 
authorized response to future justifying circumstances, and would fail 
to ensure legislative control over defining the rules of conduct. 
One may want to argue that the analogy to excuse defenses still 
applies, in that a justification defense ought to be available in special 
circumstances where the legislature has not enacted a comprehensive 
criminal code and may be relying upon courts to ensure that injustices 
are avoided through the proper recognition of exculpatory defenses.  
Under this reasoning, a common law justification defense, judicial 
creation of a justification defense, and retroactive application of a 
justification defense should be made available if there is no 
comprehensive criminal code and recognition of the defenses is 
necessary to avoid an injustice.  But the fact is, the need to avoid 
injustice does not drive the formulation or application of objective 
justification defenses.  Any potential injustice can be avoided by 
excusing an offender under the mistake-as-to-a-justification defense.148
Because the goal of justification defenses as rules of conduct is to 
give future conduct guidance, not to adjudicate past violations, the 
primary goals of the legality doctrines when applied to justification de-
fenses ought to be to assure fair notice of the conduct rules, to in-
crease future compliance with them, and to ensure legislative control 
over them.  Just as fair notice and legislative supremacy require fixed 
and clear statutory definitions of prohibitions and duties, so too do 
they require fixed and clear justification defenses.  Thus common law 
and judicial creation of justification defenses should be barred.  (Of 
147 See ROBINSON, STRUCTURE & FUNCTION, supra note 119, at 140 (finding that 
the criminal law doctrines of rule articulation, liability, and grading are fully interre-
lated and interwoven with one another). 
148 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09 (1962) (discussing mistake and reasonable 
belief in justification defenses); FINAL REPORT ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 
145, § 608(1), at 52 (excusing behavior based on a mistaken belief of the necessity for 
such behavior); ROBINSON, supra note 41, § 8.5, at 451-67 (summarizing the law gov-
erning mistake as to a justification). 
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course, a person who reasonably relies upon a common law or a judi-
cially created justification defense may get a mistake-as-to-a-justifica-
tion excuse.) 
As to rules of construction, fair notice requires that an ambiguous 
statutory justification defense be interpreted broadly.  (If, however, it 
is interpreted narrowly, such interpretation should not be retroac-
tively applied.)  In this same vein, there seems little reason why the 
legislature ought not to be able to provide a new or broader justifica-
tion defense ex post facto.  Indeed, one might argue that such ex post 
facto application would better announce the new conduct rule for fu-
ture use:  that applying the old conduct rule, even for cases that oc-
curred when the old rule was in effect, might undercut the clarity of 
the future rule.  (This is not to say that a legislature should apply a 
new or broader justification defense ex post facto, only that it ought 
not to be barred from choosing to do so.) 
Finally, vague justification defenses should be barred.  (Although, 
again, an actor may be entitled to a mistake-as-to-a-justification ex-
cuse.)  The standard of vagueness applied to justification defenses 
may not be as stringent as that applied to the definition of prohibi-
tions and duties.  As in all cases, the vagueness judgment must be 
made in context.  Because justification defenses are conduct rules that 
laypeople must apply in sometimes difficult situations, there is a limit 
to how detailed they can be if they are to be followed.  Recall that 
gaining compliance is one of the rules legality rationales.149  Unlike 
adjudication rules, which are applied in thoughtful circumstances af-
ter the fact, the justification conduct rules must be formulated in a 
way that allows people to remember and apply them on the spot.  
That does not necessarily require a vague standard, but it may require 
a more general rule with little detail. 
D.  Summary of Legality Implications 
The implication of rules versus adjudication legality for the appli-
cation of legality doctrines may be summarized this way: 
149 See supra Part I.G.2 (discussing the importance of clarity in criminal law as a 
means to encourage or deter certain behaviors). 
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Table 3:  Proposed Application of Legality Doctrines to 
Criminal Law Rules by Functional Group 
 
To promote fair notice and future 
compliance, but with deference to 
the legislature, Rules Legality would: 
To promote uniformity in applica-
tion and to reduce the potential 
for abuse of discretion, but with 
deference to the legislature,  
Adjudication Legality would: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legality  
Doctrine 
as to prohibited  
conduct and  
affirmative duties 
as to  
justification  
defenses 
as to offense culpability requirements 
and excuse defenses 
R U L E S  R E L A T I N G  T O  J U D G E S  
Common law 
penal rules 
Bar reliance upon 
common law  
prohibition or 
duty 
Bar reliance 
upon common 
law  
justification 
defense* 
Recognize common law culpabil-
ity or excuse defense but only if 
no comprehensive criminal code 
exists, there is no legislative con-
sideration of the issue, and it is 
necessary to avoid injustice 
Judicial  
creation of 
penal rules 
Bar judicial  
creation of  
prohibition or 
duty 
Bar judicial 
creation of  
justification 
defense*  
 
Allow judicial creation of culpabil-
ity or excuse defense but only if 
no comprehensive criminal code 
exists, there is no legislative con-
sideration of the issue, and it is 
necessary to avoid injustice 
Special  
construction 
of penal rules 
Interpret  
ambiguous offense 
and duty narrowly  
Interpret am-
biguous justifi-
cation defense 
broadly 
Interpret ambiguous statutory 
culpability or excuse defense 
broadly 
Retroactive 
application of 
judicial  
interpretation 
of penal rules 
Bar retroactive  
application of  
judicial  
interpretation (if  
interpretation 
broadens offense 
or duty) 
Bar retroactive 
application of 
judicial inter-
pretation (if 
interpretation 
narrows  
justification 
defense) 
Allow retroactive application of 
judicial interpretation that broad-
ens culpability or excuse defense 
but only if no comprehensive 
criminal code exists, there is no 
legislative consideration of the  
issue, and it is necessary to avoid 
injustice 
R U L E S  R E L A T I N G  T O  S T A T U T E S  
Ex post facto 
application of 
penal rules 
Bar ex post facto 
application of 
statutory offense 
or duty 
Allow ex post 
facto applica-
tion of new or 
broader statu-
tory justifica-
tion defense  
Allow ex post facto application of 
new or broader statutory  
culpability or excuse defense 
Vague penal 
rules 
Bar vague statutory 
offense or duty 
Bar vague 
statutory justi-
fication* (but 
keep formula-
tion workable) 
Allow vague culpability or excuse 
defense as needed 
 
* While a justification defense may be denied, the defendant may deserve a mistake-as-to-a-
justification excuse. 
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E.  Current Law’s Application of Legality Doctrines 
How does current law’s application of the legality doctrines 
compare to the application described above in terms of consistency 
with the demands of rules legality and adjudication legality?  In 
relation to the definition of prohibitions and duties, the legality 
doctrines typically are applied in the traditional way reviewed in Part I, 
for these criminal law rules have served in the past as the paradigm for 
thinking about legality.  Specifically, current law generally provides 
that reliance upon common law prohibitions and duties is barred,150 
as is judicial creation of new prohibitions or duties.151  Ambiguous 
prohibitions and duties commonly are to be interpreted narrowly 
under the special rules for the construction of penal statutes.152  
Because judicial interpretations that broaden a prohibition or duty 
typically are not permitted, there is little occasion for retroactive 
application of such rulings.  But, if such an interpretation did occur, 
there would be serious limitations on applying it retroactively.153  Ex 
post facto application of a new prohibition or duty is not permitted.154  
Vague prohibitions and duties are invalidated (although the standard 
applied takes account of the context, and special circumstances may 
suggest that fair notice is provided despite language that might 
otherwise seem vague).155
But application of legality doctrines to the other functional 
groups of criminal law rules—justification defenses (the other half of 
the conduct rules) and culpability requirements and excuse defenses 
(the doctrines of adjudication)—presents a challenge.  Current law 
might stubbornly refuse to permit common law, judicially created, 
retroactively applied, or vague rules, but if it is sensitive to the 
difference between rules legality and adjudication legality, it may wish 
to apply the legality doctrines differently to these functional groups 
than it applies the legality doctrines to the definitions of prohibitions 
and duties.156
150 See supra Part I.A. 
151 See supra Part I.B. 
152 See supra notes 38-40 (listing the states that provide special rules for the con-
struction of penal statutes). 
153 See supra Part I.E. 
154 See supra Part I.D. 
155 See supra Part I.F. 
156 Dan-Cohen notes some of the differences in application of legality rationales as 
being between conduct rules and decision rules.  Dan-Cohen, supra note 118, at 658-64 
(observing that the two rationales underlying the vagueness doctrine—fair warning 
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1.  Adjudication Legality: 
Culpability Requirements and Excuse Defenses 
Current law tracks quite well the application of legality doctrines 
to culpability requirements and excuse defenses proposed in Table 3, 
which is to say that it does not apply the legality doctrines to culpability 
and excuse defenses as it would apply them to the definitions of pro-
hibitions and duties.  It regularly alters offense definitions to read in 
culpability requirements not contained therein, as in Morissette v. 
United States,157 United States v. Kirby,158 and People v. Clark.159
and power control—do not relate to the same kinds of rules).  He argues, for example, 
that the 
basic intuition that “the law must be capable of being obeyed” and that hence 
“it must be capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects” . . . applies only to 
conduct rules:  by definition, conduct rules are all one needs to know in order 
to obey the law.  Decision rules, as such, cannot be obeyed (or disobeyed) by 
citizens; therefore, knowing them is not necessary (indeed, it is irrelevant) to 
one’s ability to obey the law. 
Id. at 673 (emphasis omitted) (quoting JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in 
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW:  ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 213-14 (1979)). 
157 342 U.S. 246, 263, 271-72 (1952) (holding that criminal intent is an essential 
element of the crime of knowing conversion of government property even if such an 
intent requirement is not mentioned in the statute).  The Supreme Court in Morissette 
read in an intent requirement even though the federal theft offense does not contain 
one, thus barring liability for a defendant who picked up what he reasonably assumed 
were abandoned brass shell casings.  Id. at 247, 271-72, 276. 
158 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1868).  The Kirby Court read an intent-to-obstruct re-
quirement into the offense of obstructing mail, and concluded that the statute does 
not apply to police officers who arrest mail carriers.  Id. at 486. 
159 151 N.E. 631 (N.Y. 1926).  The Clark court read in an intent requirement be-
cause the offense was sufficiently serious that the court thought the legislature must 
have intended such a requirement, even though it was not expressly provided: 
It is plain that the Legislature must have intended that either a general crimi-
nal intent or a specific intent to do the prohibited act must be shown before a 
public officer can be convicted as a felon [for unlawfully taking a fee as a pub-
lic officer].  When the Legislature supplies only the test of whether an act is 
“authorized by law,” and that test may be applied only by knowledge not only 
of relevant statutes but of relevant rules of common law, it would be unrea-
sonable to hold that the Legislature intended that criminal intent must be 
found, though the defendant made a mistake of law. 
Id. at 636.  Although the court held that “in statutory crime[s] the only criminal intent 
which need be shown is the specific intent to do the prohibited act,” it also recognized 
that “in each case it depends upon the construction which the court places upon the 
statute.”  Id. at 635.  The court concluded that “[o]rdinarily, ignorance of law can 
constitute no excuse or defense to criminal prosecution, but here there can be no 
intent to do the prohibited act, unless there is knowledge that the compensation or 
reward is more than is permitted in law.”  Id. 
 
388 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 335 
 
So too for excuses, such as insanity.160  Courts rely upon a com-
mon law insanity defense, as in State v. Esser,161 and have created their 
own insanity defense formulation (or have adjusted the formulation as 
they saw fit).  United States v. Brawner,162 overruling an earlier decision 
of its own court, is only the most famous of a host of cases that adopt 
the ALI formulation.163  (While adoption of the ALI test typically 
broadens the defense from its previous formulation, Brawner narrowed 
the defense, overruling the much broader “Durham product test,” but 
then was careful to expressly limit the application of its decision to 
prospective use only.)164  While the insanity excuse is notoriously 
160 The ALI test for insanity provides that “[a] person is not responsible for crimi-
nal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he 
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 
4.01(1) (1962) (second brackets in original). 
161 115 N.W.2d 505, 514, 521-22 (Wis. 1962) (discussing a statute providing that 
common law rules not in conflict with the criminal code are preserved, and asserting 
the right to modify the common law formulation).  Esser authorizes courts to adjust 
common law rules as they see fit, without making any distinction between kinds of doc-
trines.  Id. at 515.  In Esser, the court modified the common law test of insanity by 
adopting the ALI test.  Id. at 520-21. 
162 471 F.2d 969, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).  Brawner rejected the Durham 
test, see Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (“[A]n  ac-
cused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease 
or mental defect.”), in favor of the ALI “substantial capacity” test.  The court in Brawner 
recognized the existence of and the need for jury discretion in considering the insanity 
plea: 
The jury is concerned with applying the community understanding of this 
broad rule to particular lay and medical facts.  Where the matter is unclear it 
naturally will call on its own sense of justice to help it determine the matter.  
There is wisdom in the view that a jury generally understands well enough that 
an instruction composed in flexible terms gives it sufficient latitude so that, 
without disregarding the instruction, it can provide that application of the in-
struction which harmonizes with its sense of justice. 
Id. at 988-89. 
163 See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 623-25 (2d Cir. 1966) (adopt-
ing the ALI test); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 1961) (same); 
United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 926-27 (4th Cir. 1968) (same); Blake v. 
United States, 407 F.2d 908, 915 (5th Cir. 1969) (same); United States v. Smith, 404 
F.2d 720, 727 (6th Cir. 1968) (same); United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680, 688 (7th 
Cir. 1967) (same); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 735 (8th Cir. 1967) (same); 
Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 71 (9th Cir. 1970) (same); Wion v. United States, 
325 F.2d 420, 430 (10th Cir. 1963) (same). 
164 The court held that the decision was prospective in its application and applied 
only to trials commencing after June 23, 1972, the date of the court’s decision.  
Brawner, 471 F.2d at 973. 
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broad in its standards, it nonetheless has withstood the vagueness 
challenge, as in State v. Pennington.165
The excuse of mistake as to a justification has been treated in a 
similar manner.  Where the legislature has not barred the common 
law excuse, some courts have recognized it, as in State v. Fischer166 and 
State v. Bailey.167  On the other hand, where the legislature has ad-
dressed the issue, or where there is no impending injustice, courts can 
narrow the excuse through interpretation.  For example, in State v. 
Bowens, the court refused to adopt a form of the imperfect self-defense 
standard because doing so would have required the court to formulate 
165 618 S.W.2d 614, 617-18 (Mo. 1981) (holding that the defendant was not enti-
tled to relief on the basis of a claim that the definition of “mental disease or defect” 
was vague).  The Pennington court concluded that the vagueness rule only applies to 
prohibitions (of which the insanity defense is not): 
The doctrine of vagueness, as applied to the definition of crimes, is that the 
legislature must inform the citizen with some degree of specificity just what 
acts are prohibited, thus affording an understandable rule of conduct.  We 
doubt, however, that the vagueness doctrine, at least as it is applied to statutes 
defining crimes, has any application to this case.  Chapter 552 [the state stat-
ute pertaining to criminal prosecutions of mentally ill persons] does not pro-
hibit an accused from any conduct.  It does prohibit the State from trying, 
convicting or sentencing any person who by reason of a mental disease lacks 
the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own 
defense, and as stated in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), it “jealously 
guards” a defendant’s right to a fair trial, and is “constitutionally adequate to 
protect a defendant’s right not to be tried while legally incompetent.”  We 
find no merit to appellant’s challenge to Chapter 552 on the ground of 
vagueness. 
Id. (internal citations and accompanying quotation marks omitted and parallel 
citations omitted).  This language would seem to suggest that the vagueness doctrine 
does not apply to justification defenses either.  Cf. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING 
CRIMINAL LAW 576 (1978) (“The demands of legislative specificity are stricter in the 
category of definition than in the analysis of justification and excuse.”).  On the other 
hand, the Durham insanity rule adopted by the D.C. Circuit was extremely vague:  “an 
accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental 
disease or mental defect.”  Durham, 214 F.2d at 874-75.  None of the essential terms of 
the defense were defined.  Eight years later the full D.C. Circuit determined that more 
specificity was required, not in order to satisfy constitutional standards, but rather to 
offer the jury further guidance.  McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. 
Cir. 1962) (en banc) (per curiam). 
166 598 P.2d 742, 744 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (relying upon the common law to 
provide a mistake-as-to-a-justification excuse).  The court held that provisions of the 
new criminal code were not intended to abrogate common law self-defense require-
ments.  Id. 
167 591 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (noting that the state’s new crimi-
nal code allows continued reliance upon common law rules and holding that common 
law rules, as opposed to the existing statutory rules, require a subjective perspective 
from which to judge self-defense). 
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a new, broader manslaughter offense.168  Additionally, in State v. 
Owens, the court declined to broaden the application of the state’s 
self-defense statute to include threatening behavior from a 
generalized group of actors.169
The same pattern is found in other doctrines of adjudication, 
such as in Esquibel v. State, where the court created a duress of 
circumstances excuse to avoid an injustice.170 Similarly, in State v. 
Phipps, the court deferred to the legislature’s modern criminal code in 
refusing to recognize a homicide mitigation for diminished 
capacity.171  (Courts are not hesitant, however, to refuse to recognize 
an excuse where justice does not require it.)172
Finally, new or broader statutory defenses and mitigations are 
commonly applied ex post facto to all of the doctrines of adjudication.  
The Model Penal Code directs that “a defense or mitigation” provided 
in a new code be available ex post facto, with the defendant’s permis-
sion.173  (Some courts, such as those that ruled on Collins v.  
 
168 532 A.2d 215, 220 (N.J. 1987) (refusing to create a new “unspecified form of 
manslaughter” because doing so would be a violation of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-5(a) 
(West 1981), which the court construed to mean “that only the Legislature may create 
a new category of substantive crime”).  However, the legislature’s lack of clarification 
of statutory law allowed the court to narrow the excuse by barring mitigation:  “The 
Legislature has not specifically stated that an honest but unreasonable belief, although 
not a justification for an unlawful homicide, might nonetheless constitute a mitigation 
of unlawful homicide.  We believe that it does not.”  Id. at 219. 
169 601 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Neb. 1999) (“[T]he excuse of self-defense is applied to 
the threatening behavior of ‘another person,’ not to a generalized group of actors.  
Merely identifying a group of possible assailants . . . and directing the jury to consider 
whether anyone in this group threatened the defendant, impermissibly broadens the 
application of [the self-defense statute].”). 
170 576 P.2d 1129, 1132-33 (N.M. 1978).  The court created the excuse for a de-
fendant who escaped from prison to avoid beatings from and threats issued by prison 
guards.  Id.  An earlier decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court had held that 
“[w]hatever the reason, if any, for legislative inaction, that reason does not bar the ju-
diciary from reconsidering a judge-made rule.  Similarly, legislative enactments de-
signed to make the judge-made rule work or ameliorate its harshness cannot be taken 
as legislative integration of the rule into statutory law.”  Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 
1239 (N.M. 1981) (internal citation omitted). 
171 883 S.W.2d 138, 143 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (directing that evidence of men-
tal illness could be introduced to negate a required culpability element of the offense). 
172 See, e.g., People v. Tanner, 91 Cal. Rptr. 656, 659 (Ct. App. 1970) (denying the 
defendant’s insanity defense based on the theory that a chromosomal abnormality 
produced a mental disease). 
173 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.01(3)(b) (1962). 
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Youngblood,174 People v. Maloy,175 and Kring v. Missouri,176 conclude that 
the Constitution bars the withdrawal or narrowing of any defense, 
statutory or judge-made, available at the time of the offense.)  But the 
Model Penal Code goes too far.  It incorrectly assumes that the ex post 
facto prohibition operates with regard to excuse defenses in the same 
way that it interacts with the definitions of prohibitions and duties.  
The fair notice rationales that support the ex post facto bar for 
prohibitions and duties do not apply to excuses.  No person should 
commit an offense relying upon the fact that she will be excused 
(through, for example, insanity, immaturity, or mistake).  Indeed, by 
their very definition, the excuse defenses assume that the actor is 
incapable of such calculating action.177  As discussed in the next sec-
tion, justification defenses may claim to be more similar to the defini-
tions of prohibitions and duties, and the ex post facto fair notice ra-
tionale applies to such defenses.178
174 497 U.S. 37 (1990).  The Court explained: 
 It is settled, by decisions of this Court so well known that their citation may 
be dispensed with, that any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously 
committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome 
the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one 
charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when 
the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto. 
Id. at 42 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925)). 
175 People v. Maloy, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 691 (Ct. App. 1995).  The court elaborated: 
 In our view, the term “defense” as it is employed in Youngblood refers to a 
defense that bears upon criminal culpability for the act constituting the crime.  
In other words, the defense renders the act noncriminal, such as self-defense, 
or diminishes its culpability, such as heat of passion in manslaughter versus 
murder.  Further, the defense exists at the time the act was committed.  Thus, 
the defense must be integral to the nature of the act.  Therefore, abrogating 
the defense or changing it by more stringent statutory implementation would 
render the act culpable or would increase culpability.  In effect, an ex post 
facto law depriving one of a defense alters the nature of the act that consti-
tutes the crime. 
Id. at 699. 
176 107 U.S. 221 (1883), overruled by Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37.  In dicta, the Kring 
Court said that it is a violation of the ex post facto prohibition to bar at trial a defense 
that had been available at the time of the offense.  The Court noted that “it would be a 
violation of the constitutional maxim which forbids retrospective legislation inconsis-
tent with vested rights to deprive, by a repeal of statutes of limitation, a defendant of a 
defence which had become perfect while they were in force.”  Id. at 250.  The Court 
did not distinguish among kinds of defenses. 
177 See generally ROBINSON, supra note 41, § 9.1, at 477-98 (summarizing the theory 
of excuse defenses and their common elements). 
178 See supra text accompanying notes 60-62 (discussing the ex post facto fair notice 
rationale). 
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Of course, not every case follows the legality applications 
proposed in Table 3.179  This confusion could be remedied by explicit 
recognition of adjudication legality as distinct from rules legality, and 
of the need for a different application of legality doctrines when ap-
plied to adjudication rules. 
2.  Rules Legality:  Justification Defenses 
Current law’s application of legality doctrines to justification de-
fenses presents a more mixed picture than is seen in its application to 
culpability requirements and excuse defenses.  It seems as if current 
law is torn between treating justifications in the same manner it treats 
prohibitions and duties, or treating them as it treats excuse defenses.  
As the summary in Table 3 suggests, it is argued here that, with some 
exceptions, legality doctrines ought to be applied to justification de-
fenses as they are applied to prohibitions and duties, because justifica-
tions share the function of announcing the criminal law’s ex ante 
rules of conduct with prohibitions and duties.  To the extent that 
there is a need to assure that blameless offenders are exculpated, the 
mistake-as-to-a-justification excuse can perform the role.  The function 
of justification defenses, like the function of the definition of prohibi-
tions and duties, is to look to the future rather than to the past, and to 
179 For example, in State v. Bradley, where prior caselaw had denied a mistake-as-to-
a-justification excuse to persons defending themselves against an arresting police offi-
cer, the court extended the exception to persons using force against correctional offi-
cers, arguing that the underlying public policy made the correctional officers analo-
gous to police officers.  10 P.3d 358, 363-64 (Wash. 2000).  And the court in State v. 
Mellenberger retroactively applied its rejection of a liability defense based on the wrong-
doing of another (particeps criminis), reasoning that it is a malum in se offense.  95 P.2d 
709, 718 (Or. 1939).  The court explained: 
[N]o man ought to be convicted under a law which, in his instance, operates 
against him retroactively.  However, the crime charged against the defendants 
is a statutory crime and its elements are those stated in the statute.  In the ap-
plication of the doctrine of stare decisis a distinction can be made, we believe, 
between crimes malum per se and crimes malum prohibitum so far as the 
compulsory character of the doctrine is concerned. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]he doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent us from overruling that 
part of [our precedent] which endeavored to infuse into the criminal law the 
doctrine of particeps criminis.  In our opinion, the fact that the victim was en-
deavoring to do something immoral or unlawful at the time when he was 
cheated by a more clever scoundrel does not prevent the state from maintain-
ing a prosecution against the latter.  It follows from the preceding that the 
contention of the defendant which we have just been reviewing is without 
merit. 
Id. at 718-20 (internal cross-reference omitted). 
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signal those special circumstances in which the criminal law author-
izes a person to do what is otherwise criminal.  The rationale of rules 
legality suggests that its function is best performed by the legislature, 
that such function must be precise enough to guide conduct, and that 
the legislature necessarily must concern itself only with future offenses 
and not with the adjudication of past offenses. 
In a good number of cases, courts fail to follow the directions of 
rules legality summarized in Table 3.  Even where the legislature has 
addressed the issue, a court may revise the statutory rule as it thinks 
best.  In People v. Jacobs, the court barred the defendant’s statutorily 
provided justification defense for the unintentional shooting of a 
bystander while trying to apprehend his mugger.180  The court held 
that permitting such a defense would lead to “absurd” results and, 
therefore, the court assumed that the legislature did not intend such 
use of the justification.181
A court may retroactively apply its narrowing of a justification de-
fense.  In State v. Garcia, for example, the court retroactively applied 
its expansion of the rule that forbids resistance to even an unlawful 
180 432 N.Y.S.2d 614, 619 (Sup. Ct. 1980). 
181 Id.  The court explained: 
 With respect to the count charging negligent assault, there is no reason to 
assume that the Legislature intended to protect peace officers from criminal 
responsibility and hold civilians accountable when the use of deadly physical 
force is authorized for both.  Accordingly, the count charging negligent as-
sault is dismissed. 
 The final issue of the motion relates to the charges of reckless endanger-
ment and reckless assault. 
 Defendant contends that “under the statutory scheme in its entirety, it is 
simply not possible for conduct to be justifiable on the one hand, and either 
reckless or negligent on the other.” 
 However, in the words of the Courts of Appeals, “We will not blindly apply 
the words of a statute to arrive at an unreasonable or absurd result.” 
 It is inconceivable that the Legislature intended to permit such conduct.  
For example, if a person forcibly robbed a person of a wallet in Yankee Sta-
dium and ran down the aisles, a civilian could fire numerous shots at him, re-
gardless of the danger to hundreds of innocent bystanders.  If the defendant’s 
view should prevail, the civilian shooter could not be held criminally liable 
even if he killed a dozen people.  This court cannot believe that the Legisla-
ture intended such an absurd result. 
 Indeed, using that same fact pattern, even a New York City police officer 
would not be liable for such conduct, since recent legislation (obviously an 
oversight) eliminated such police officers from the definition of peace offi-
cers. 
Id. (quoting Williams v. Williams, 23 N.Y.2d 592, 599 (1969)). 
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arrest by a police officer; the defendant had resisted a prison guard.182  
One might think this failed to give fair notice, but the court held that 
the expansion was not “unexpected and indefensible.”183
A court may rely upon a common law justification defense or may 
create its own justification defense, even though the legislature has 
chosen not to adopt such a justification.  The court in People v. Lover-
camp relied upon a common law necessity justification to find for the 
defendant184 (even though the California Penal Code declared that 
“[n]o act or omission . . . is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or 
authorized by this Code”).185  In Fields v. State, the court formulated its 
own rule to govern resistance to an unlawful arrest, concluding that 
the common law rule is “outmoded”186 (despite that the Indiana Code 
provided that “[c]rimes shall be defined and punishment therefor fixed by 
182 27 P.3d 1225, 1227 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (“That our Supreme Court would 
adopt the ‘arrest rule’ [allowing the use of reasonable force to resist arrest] in analyz-
ing a self defense claim against correctional officers was foreseeable . . . .”). 
183 Id. (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964)). 
In this case, the petitioner had a strong argument that the Washington Court 
of Appeals engaged in retroactive judicial decision-making because it either 
abolished the common law defense of self-defense, or interpreted it in an un-
foreseeable manner by significantly limiting the self-defense doctrine.  The 
Washington Court of Appeals, like the United States Supreme Court, applied 
Bouie’s “unexpected and indefensible” language to permit a change in the law, 
not just an interpretation of existing law. 
Heyward D. Armstrong, Comment, Rogers v. Tennessee:  An Assault on Legality and Due 
Process, 81 N.C. L. REV. 317, 347-48 (2002) (footnote omitted). 
184 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 116 (Ct. App. 1974) (vacating the defendant’s conviction 
for escaping from confinement and recognizing that “some conditions excuse the fel-
ony”); see also United States v. Mason, 233 F.3d 619, 622-23 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (requiring 
imminent threat of death or bodily injury to trigger the justification defense); People 
v. Trujillo, 586 P.2d 235, 237-38 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (granting a prisoner an oppor-
tunity to claim that his escape was motivated by duress); People v. Unger, 362 N.E.2d 
319, 323-24 (Ill. 1977) (allowing a necessity defense for a prison inmate who escaped 
after receiving alleged threats from other inmates); People v. Harmon, 220 N.W.2d 
212, 213 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (allowing an escapee to claim a defense of duress be-
cause of his fear of prison rape). 
185 CAL. PENAL CODE § 6 (Deering 1971) (emphasis added). 
186 382 N.E.2d 972, 975, 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (redefining self-defense to ex-
clude the right to resist unlawful arrest and therefore affirming the defendant’s convic-
tion).  The court held that 
the common law rule is outmoded in our modern society.  A citizen, today, 
can seek his remedy for a policeman’s unwarranted and illegal intrusion into 
the citizen’s private affairs by bringing a civil action in the courts against the 
police officer and the governmental unit which the officer represents.  The 
common law right of forceful resistance to an unlawful arrest tends to pro-
mote violence and increases the chances of someone getting injured or killed. 
Id. at 975. 
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statutes of this state and not otherwise”).187  In State v. Gorham, the court 
created a law enforcement authority justification because it concluded 
that good social policy would prefer it.188  In Newby v. United States, the 
court recognized a common law right to use force to discipline 
children, but took it upon itself to narrow the common law defense 
for what it saw as good public policy reasons.189  In State v. Jackson, the 
court recognized a common law right of a parent to keep his child 
home from school for health reasons although an existing statute 
required permission of the school board without exception.190
Of course, there will be some occasions where the legislature has 
expressly delegated to the courts the right—essentially the duty—to 
create and adjust justification defenses as needed.191  But absent such 
a delegation, the rationales of rules legality dictate that courts be as 
hesitant to engage in such lawmaking for justification defenses as they 
would be for defining prohibitions and duties. 
But the justification picture is not completely bleak.  Other courts 
appear to appreciate the rationales of rules legality, and their differ-
ences with the rationales of adjudication legality, even though the dis-
tinction has never been formally expressed.  That is, some courts resist 
treating justification defenses as special cases like excuse defenses.  In 
Kauffman v. State, where the criminal code recognized the existence of 
the common law unless and until the legislature did something to 
change it, the court declined to recognize a medical necessity defense 
for the medical use of marijuana because it concluded that the 
criminal code had foreclosed the issue.192  In Allison v. City of Birming-
187 IND. CODE ANN. § 1-1-2-2 (West 1976) (emphasis added). 
188 188 P. 457, 458 (Wash. 1920) (creating a law enforcement justification defense 
for an officer who exceeded the speed limit of a neighboring jurisdiction while in pur-
suit of an offender).  “If these officers may not pursue and overtake one violating the 
regulations without themselves becoming amenable to the penalties imposed by them, 
the old remedy of hue and cry is not available in such instances, and many offenders 
who are now brought to answer will escape.”  Id. 
189 797 A.2d 1233, 1244 (D.C. 2002).  The court adopted a reasonable force stan-
dard that appears in some cases, rather than the malice standard of other cases, which 
the defendant urged. 
190 976 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Wash. 1999) (holding that while the court agrees with the 
“State that the common law imposes a duty upon parents to protect children in their 
custody, [the court does] not agree that a parent’s failure to perform this duty subjects 
[her] to liability as an accomplice to a crime”). 
191 See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 8 (providing that common law defenses 
should supplement statutory offenses). 
192 620 So. 2d 90, 92 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).  The court noted that the code “pro-
vides that ‘[a]ny person or any practitioner who prescribes or dispenses cannabis or 
any of its derivatives for reasons other than outlined in this article upon conviction 
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ham, the court noted that although the necessity defense is not 
codified, the official commentary to the code expressly authorizes 
courts to recognize and develop further justification defenses.193  
(Nevertheless, the court declined to recognize a necessity defense for 
trespass on abortion clinic property.)194  In State v. Tate, where a 
codified necessity statute expressly barred the defense if it would be 
inconsistent with any expressed legislative intent, the court barred a 
necessity defense for the medical use of marijuana, citing expressions 
of legislative intent.195  In United States v. Banks, the court declined to 
thereof shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished as provided in section 
13A-12-211 [unlawful distribution of controlled substances].’”  Id. (quoting ALA. CODE 
§ 20-2-120 (LexisNexis 1975)) (brackets in original).  The Alabama legislature adopted 
the common law defense of necessity “so far as it is not inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion, laws and institutions of this state.”  ALA. CODE § 1-3-1 (LexisNexis 1975).  The 
court relied on the fact that the Alabama legislature had precluded assertions of the 
medical necessity defense for marijuana when it enacted the Controlled Substances 
Therapeutic Research Act.  See Kauffman, 620 So. 2d at 92 (“The stated purposes of the 
Therapeutic Research Act reveal that marijuana lacks accepted safety and has no ac-
cepted medical use. . . . While marijuana may be useful in the treatment of some medi-
cal conditions it has not achieved accepted medical use or safety in its prescription and 
application.” (quoting Isbell v. State, 428 So. 2d 215, 216-17 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983))). 
193 580 So. 2d 1377, 1379-80, 1382 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).  The court explained: 
 Section 13A-3-21(a), Code of Alabama 1975, states that “[e]xcept as other-
wise expressly provided, justification or excuse under this article is a defense.”  
Various defenses are set out in the subsequent statutes (see § 13A-3-22 
through § 13A-3-30).  Although the specific defense of necessity is not codi-
fied within these statutes, the commentary to § 13A-3-21 explicitly states that 
“[w]hile much law is covered in this article, no codification can be complete, 
and these formulations are not intended to preclude further judicial, or statu-
tory, development of these, or other, justifications.” 
 Thus, our recognition of the necessity defense must be derived from the 
common law. 
Id. at 1379-80. 
194 The court concluded that “necessity is not a valid defense to the charge of 
criminal trespass involving abortion clinics,” and noted that the democratic process is 
the proper means for changing the legal status of abortion.  Id. at 1382.  “A contrary 
holding would allow an individual to violate the law without sanction whenever he felt 
the government had not made the proper choice between conflicting values.”  Id. 
(quoting State v. Horn, 377 N.W.2d 176, 180 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985)). 
195 505 A.2d 941, 944-45 (N.J. 1986).  The statutory section covering “necessity” in 
Tate provides: 
 Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of ne-
cessity to the extent permitted by law and as to which neither the code nor 
other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses deal-
ing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the 
justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear. 
Id. at 944 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-2 (West 1980)).  The court concluded from 
the language that 
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recognize a necessity defense or to broaden the statutory duress 
defense to cover situations of necessity, citing the special needs of the 
military to have clear and unexceptional rules.196  In People v. Whipple, 
the court declined to recognize a common law necessity defense for a 
defendant who escaped from a prison camp to avoid cruel treatment, 
holding that reliance upon the common law had been abolished by 
statute.197  In State v. Jardine, the court declined to recognize a 
“defense of third persons” justification for protecting an unborn 
child, leaving it to the legislature to decide whether such an 
expansion of the defense should be authorized.198  In State v. Crouser, 
the court held that, despite the generality of the justification defense’s 
standard for the use of force by parents—the force must be 
“reasonably related to the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the 
welfare of the minor”—the defense was not unconstitutionally 
vague.199
the Legislature managed to set forth three limiting criteria governing the de-
fense:  (1) conduct is justifiable only to the extent permitted by law, (2) the 
defense is unavailable if either the Code or other statutory law defining the of-
fense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation in-
volved, and (3) the defense is unavailable if a legislative purpose to exclude 
the justification otherwise plainly appears. 
Id. 
196 37 M.J. 700, 702 (A.C.M.R. 1993) (“[R]ejecting the necessity defense goes to 
the core of discipline within a military organization.  In no other segment of our soci-
ety is it more important to have a single enforceable set of standards.”). 
197 279 P. 1008, 1010 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1929).  The court explained: 
 In this state the common law is of no effect so far as the specification of 
what acts or conduct shall constitute a crime is concerned.  In order that a 
public offense be committed, some statute, ordinance, or regulation prior in 
time to the commission of the act must denounce it; likewise with excuses or 
justifications—if no statutory excuse or justification apply as to the commis-
sion of the particular offense, neither the common law nor the so-called “un-
written law” may legally supply it. 
Id. at 1009 (citations and emphasis omitted).  Interestingly, the court nonetheless felt 
compelled to discuss at length the policy considerations for and against recognizing 
such a defense.  See id. at 1010 (explaining how allowing such a defense would have a 
negative impact on maintaining discipline in prisons). 
198 61 P.3d 514, 521 (Haw. Ct. App. 2002) (“While there may be sound public pol-
icy reasons to allow a choice of evils justification defense for the protection of unborn 
children, the adoption of such a public policy is best left to the state legislature.”). 
199 911 P.2d 725, 728 n.2, 735 (Haw. 1996) (quoting HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-
309(1)(a) (1993)).  The court continued: 
An ordinary reading of [the statute] gives sufficient notice to a reasonable 
person that there are limits to both the purpose and degree of force that may 
justifiably be used against a minor and defines those limits with reasonable 
clarity.  Thus, the statute cannot be said to be unconstitutionally vague. 
Id. at 735. 
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CONCLUSION 
Several rationales are offered in support of the traditional legality 
principle:  providing fair notice; gaining compliance with criminal law 
rules, including effective deterrence and avoiding overdeterrence (the 
chilling effect); reserving the criminalization authority to the legisla-
ture; increasing uniformity in application; and reducing the potential 
for abuse of discretion.  What has not been previously recognized is 
that the first three rationales address how the criminal law should per-
form its ex ante function of announcing the rules of conduct, a func-
tion that is carried out primarily by the criminal law’s definitions of 
prohibited conduct and affirmative duties and by justification de-
fenses.  And the last three rationales address how the criminal law 
should perform its ex post function of adjudicating a violation of the 
rules of conduct, a function that is carried out primarily by the culpa-
bility requirements of offense definitions and by excuse defenses. 
Thus, to effectively further the rationales of legality, the criminal 
law should recognize two legality principles—rules legality and adju-
dication legality—and should apply each of the six legality doctrines 
differently according to the particular function of each criminal law 
rule.  This significance of function to legality has two important impli-
cations.  First, the legality doctrines ought to be applied differently to 
culpability requirements and excuse defenses than to the definitions 
of prohibitions and duties.  Many courts have had this insight, albeit 
without a full understanding of the larger conceptual analysis that 
supports it.  Second, the legality doctrines ought to be applied differ-
ently to objective justification defenses than to culpability and excuse 
defenses.  Most courts have not yet had this insight.  A failure to adjust 
the application of legality doctrines according to the function of the 
criminal law rule undermines the success of the goals we seek to ad-
vance by our commitment to legality. 
 
